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Abstract
We explore whether the tone of central bank communication matters for asset
prices and find that tone changes have a significant effect on equity returns. Stock
prices increase when tone becomes more positive and vice versa. Moreover, we
find that positive tone changes are associated with increasing bond yields, lower
implied equity volatility, lower variance risk premia, and lower credit spreads.
Since we also show that tone changes are largely unrelated to current and future
economic fundamentals, our results suggest that central bank tone matters for
asset prices through a risk-based channel.
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“I don’t think I’m stepping up my rhetoric on inflation, Draghi said [...]. Financial market
analysts nonetheless detected a shift in tone if not in substance of monetary policy.”
Reuters, April 4th, 2012
“All eyes will be on the ECB this afternoon. If the tone is clearly dovish, then it could maybe
stop the bleeding on the market.” Reuters, August 7th, 2014
“This time, it’s very hard to predict [...] the tone in the press conference, and investors are
quite anxious.” Reuters, November 2nd, 2014
Given the uncertainty, how Ms. Yellen frames what the Fed is doing will be as important as
what the Fed actually does.” Wall Street Journal, September 16th, 2015
1. Introduction
Central bank communication shapes market expectations and has become an integral part of
the monetary policy toolkit.1 As such, central bank (CB) communication is closely followed
by market participants, extensively covered in the financial press, and central banks evaluate
the media coverage of their statements to gauge the effectiveness of their communication. To
accommodate the rising importance of communication, numerous central banks nowadays
hold live press conferences, so that information becomes available to all market participants
at the same time. At these press conferences, market participants do not only pay attention
to the content but also, as the above quotes illustrate, closely follow the tone of central bank
statements.
This paper explores how the tone of CB press conference statements affects prices in
equity, government bond, and other asset markets. To quantify CB tone, we employ standard
techniques of textual analysis. First, we use the financial dictionary developed by Loughran
and McDonald (2011) to identify negative words in a CB statement.2 Second, we evaluate
1For an overview of the literature on central bank communication see, e.g., Woodford (2005) and Blinder
et al. (2008).
2This dictionary has already proven useful in different financial contexts (see the survey of Loughran and
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the tone of the statement by assessing the prevalence of negative words in its text and
construct a measure of tone such that higher values reflect a more positive tone of the CB
and vice versa. By repeating this procedure and scoring each press conference statement
individually, we construct a time-series of CB tone that we use to study if and how CB
tone affects prices. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use such an objective
and systematic approach to measure the tone of CB statements and its impact on financial
markets.3
In our empirical analysis, we focus on press conferences held by the European Central
Bank (ECB), because the ECB was the first CB to set up comprehensive press conferences
directly after meetings of its Governing Council. These press conferences are broadcasted live
and thus represent a source of real-time information for market participants.4 We evaluate
the tone of the ECB president’s statement during these press conferences from January
1999 to October 2014. Given that ECB press conferences take place on Thursdays in the
early afternoon (14:30 CET), any information revealed during the press conference can affect
financial market prices directly on the same day. Our empirical results show that ECB tone
indeed has a statistically and economically significant effect on equity and government bond
prices on the day of the press conference and that this effect propagates beyond the release
day through the cycle to the next ECB press conference.
Our first main result is that changes in ECB tone have a significant effect on stock
prices on the day of the press conference (PC). When ECB tone becomes more positive
compared to the previous PC, equity prices increase by about 25 basis points (bp) whereas
McDonald, 2016) but we are the first to apply it to central bank statements.
3Related papers typically aim at measuring the content rather than the tone of central bank commu-
nication, use textual analysis or narrative approaches that require double usage of data, and/or subjective
judgements. For instance, Romer and Romer (2004) apply a narrative approach to central bank documents
to identify monetary policy shocks. Rosa and Verga (2007) and Rosa (2011) construct a proxy for tone
but use a narrative approach and self-defined dictionaries, which are subjective and relatively narrow in
scope. Lucca and Trebbi (2009) analyze the content of FOMC statements by semantic orientation scores
that are computed from a extremely large set of information obtained through search engines. Our approach
exclusively focuses on the text of the CB statement itself and measures tone directly from this statement.
We choose an off-the-shelf dictionary that we do not change in any way and use a simple tone metric to
provide a transparent measure of tone in a real-time setting that avoids hindsight bias from using the data
twice (e.g., for first constructing a dictionary or training an algorithm that is subsequently applied in the
empirical analysis).
4We discuss these features and their usefulness for our empirical analysis in more detail in Section 2.1.
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a more negative tone is associated with a return of −35 bp on that day. This differential
of about 60 bp is statistically significant. We find very similar effects for a broad stock
market index (MSCI EMU), an index of large stocks that can be traded via highly liquid
futures contracts (Eurostoxx50), as well as value and growth stocks (MSCI value and growth
indices for the Eurozone, respectively). With approximately twelve ECB press conferences
per year, this tone-related return differential of 60 bp annualizes to around 7% in absolute
value which seems economically large. Similarly, regression evidence suggests that a one-
standard deviation shock to tone translates into an equity return of ±30 bp on PC days,
depending on whether ECB tone becomes more positive or negative.
Second, we show that the effect of tone on equity prices is not confined to PC days but
persists beyond the day of the press conference. The PC-day return differential of around 60
bp increases to more than 100 bp over the cycle to the next press conference. This finding
suggests that the effect of tone changes on equity prices is not quickly reversed after PC days
but rather that the information conveyed by CB tone gradually diffuses into equity prices
over time. More generally, we show that all of the cumulative equity return (for, e.g., the
MSCI EMU) over our sample period is earned during periods when the most recent tone
change was positive whereas cumulative returns are close to zero or negative after PCs with a
negative tone change. These findings prevail even when removing PC-day effects and suggest
that all of the equity premium is generated in times of positive ECB tone. Furthermore, we
corroborate our results by documenting that tone changes have a very similar effect on all
individual EMU countries’ stock returns, which implies that our results for aggregate stock
returns in the Eurozone are not driven by a few countries.
Our finding that stock returns are related to changes in central bank tone naturally
raises the question why tone affects stock prices. Put differently, does central bank tone
affect the cash flow or the discount rate component of stock prices? If tone matters because
it affects the discount rate, is this effect driven by a link between tone and riskfree rates
and/or by a link between tone and the risk premium? To answer these questions, we study
the relation between ECB tone and interest rates, macroeconomic fundamentals, as well as
asset prices that are particularly sensitive to changes in risk aversion such as credit spreads
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and option-implied volatility.
First, we explore whether ECB tone matters for interest rates by examining the link
between tone changes and the shape of the government bond yield curve. We show that
more positive CB tone is associated with increasing yield levels on PC days as well as over
PC cycles and that the hump in the yield curve becomes more pronounced until the next PC
(because medium-term yields increase more than short- and long-term yields). In general,
yields with shorter maturities are most sensitive to CB tone changes, which is consistent
with the view that central banks control the short end of the yield curve. The nature of this
link between tone and interest rates suggests that we can rule out an explanation in which
more positive CB tone drives up stock prices via lowering yields. Instead, more positive tone
drives up stock prices and government bond yields.
Another alternative potential explanation for why more positive central bank tone drives
up equities could be that ECB tone simply aggregates information about economic funda-
mentals. Under this view, a more positive ECB tone indicates stronger economic growth
and higher cash flows. However, we find that changes in ECB tone are largely unrelated to
current and future real-time macro fundamentals and that there is no clear relation between
CB tone and survey expectations about macroeconomic fundamentals. In sum, our results
do not suggest that tone matters for equities because of a cash flow effect.
Since tone neither moves stock prices via its effect on riskfree interest rates nor because
it forecasts economic growth, we next investigate whether our findings are consistent with a
risk-based channel, as discussed in previous research that finds monetary policy (announce-
ments) to affect risk premia embedded in market prices (see, e.g., Shiller et al., 1983; Hanson
and Stein, 2014; Morris and Shin, 2014; Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Hattori et al., 2015). If
a more positive tone drives down the risk aversion of market participants, one would expect
to find the positive link between tone changes and, both, stock returns and bond yields
documented in our empirical results. We provide support for such a risk-based channel by
showing that corporate credit spreads, which are viewed as particularly sensitive to changes
in risk aversion, decrease when tone becomes more positive. We provide further support for
this view by examining the link between tone and the VSTOXX, which is commonly viewed
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as a proxy for uncertainty and risk aversion (e.g., Bekaert et al., 2013; Miranda-Agrippino
and Rey, 2014).5 Following Bekaert et al. (2013), we decompose the VSTOXX into uncer-
tainty and risk aversion and find a significantly negative relation between changes in ECB
tone and changes in option-implied risk aversion: more positive tone is associated with lower
risk aversion, and vice versa. These results support the idea that ECB tone moves asset
prices through risk premia required by market participants.
Moreover, we also present evidence that central bank tone matters for asset prices in the
U.S. While the Fed has introduced press conferences comparable to those of the ECB only
recently (in April 2011), data on the Fed Chair’s Testimonies to the U.S. Congress is available
from 1996. An interesting feature of these hearings is that the Fed Chair’s report on monetary
policy does not coincide with actual monetary policy decisions (as is the case for ECB press
conferences which take place after meetings of its Governing Council). Nonetheless, we find
that the relation between U.S. asset prices and Fed tone at these hearings is qualitatively
identical to the reaction of EMU market prices to changes in ECB tone at press conferences:
a more positive central bank tone is associated with higher equity returns and higher bond
yields compared to changes in asset prices when central bank tone becomes more negative.
These results provide further evidence that central bank tone contains generic information
for asset prices.
To corroborate our conclusions, we conduct various additional empirical exercises and
robustness checks. For example, we provide evidence that ECB tone changes mostly do
not reflect a response to recent economic and financial market developments. Our findings
remain unchanged when controlling for actual changes in the stance of monetary policy or
unconventional monetary policy announcements by the ECB. We also generate a time-series
of central bank “tone shocks” and find that using these unexpected tone changes yields
virtually the same results as using simple tone changes.
On a general level, our work relates to previous research that analyzes the effect of mone-
tary policy on asset prices and risks (e.g., Rigobon and Sack, 2004; Bjornland and Leitermo,
2009; Buraschi et al., 2014; Campbell et al., 2015). We also contribute to the literature
5The VSTOXX is an equity volatility index, computed from prices of options on the EuroStoxx50, similar
to the VIX in the U.S.
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that quantifies monetary policy shocks in terms of market prices (e.g., Kohn and Sack, 2004;
Guerkaynak et al., 2005; Brand et al., 2010; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011;
Hanson and Stein, 2014; Chodorow-Reich, 2014). In these papers, monetary policy shocks
are measured as the price change of financial variables (e.g., bond yields) in a short window
around a monetary policy announcement. Our results show that tone changes affect both
the sign and size of monetary policy shocks measured in this way and are thus informative
about the source of monetary policy shocks. Our paper also relates to studies that explore
equity returns around policy meetings and over cycles between policy meetings (e.g. Lucca
and Moench, 2015; Cieslak et al., 2016).
Our contribution is to highlight that the tone with which a central bank chooses to
communicate its monetary policy affects asset prices. To this end, our empirical results
support the idea that the ECB can, at least to a certain extent, manage market expectations
and risk appetite through central bank communication (e.g., Woodford, 2005; Blinder et al.,
2008) by signaling more optimism or pessimism (e.g., Born et al., 2013).
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 describes the setup of our empirical
analysis and Section 3 details the data and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents
empirical results on the relation between central bank tone and equity returns, and Section
5 presents evidence on the channels through which tone affects asset prices. In section 6, we
report corroborating results for U.S. markets. Section 7 concludes.
2. Empirical Setup
This section describes our empirical approach to measuring the effect of central bank tone on
asset prices. We first discuss potential data sources for measuring CB tone. Next, we specify
our approach to constructing a measure of CB tone based on press conference statements.
Third, we describe the timing of returns and price changes to gauge the direct effect of CB
tone on asset prices and the link between tone and future prices. Finally, we sketch the
econometric setup for our analysis.
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2.1. Discussion of potential data sources for measuring central bank tone
Our goal is to measure the impact of CB tone on asset prices. This requires the use of CB
statements with a precise timing, i.e., it needs to be clear when these statements become
publicly available to market participants. In this respect, press conferences by the European
Central Bank (ECB) provide an ideal setup. Following the meetings of the Governing Council
(which are scheduled well ahead of time), the ECB holds press conferences that begin with
a statement by the president. This statement is drafted in advance and serves to inform
the general public about the council’s decisions, why these decisions have been made, how
they have been reached, and a general outlook. With the press conferences taking place on
Thursdays in the early afternoon at 2:30pm CET, any new information revealed during the
press conference can affect financial market prices on the same day. ECB press conferences
are broadcasted live, are thus available in real time to all market participants, and the ECB
makes transcripts publicly available on its website.
Moreover, we focus on ECB press conferences because the ECB was the first central
bank to establish live press conferences after meetings of its Governing Council and thus
provides the longest time series of press conferences. By contrast, other central banks have
only introduced similar live press conferences in recent years and a reliable empirical study
is not feasible due to the low number of observations. For instance, the U.S. Fed held its first
comparable press conference on April 27, 2011 and at the time of writing this paper only
14 press conferences have been held. Likewise, other central banks have introduced press
conferences only recently and at lower frequency; for example, the Swiss National Bank has
adopted a news conference setting in 2011 that takes place in July and December only.
Alternative sources of communication could be the minutes of CB meetings such as
FOMC meetings or the Minutes of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy committee.
However, these minutes are only available with a time lag and are edited transcripts of
actual discussions at these meetings and therefore, by their nature, not designed as a device
to directly communicate with market participants.6 Moreover, several CBs issue statements
6Besides, a substantial portion of the content refers to administrative aspects such as listing the names
of participants in particular decisions which is not very informative.
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about decisions (e.g. Fed statements released after FOMC meetings). Compared to the
president’s statement at ECB press conferences, these are typically much shorter. As an
example, the average number of words in FOMC statements since the 1990s is lower than
that of the shortest ECB statement in our whole sample. Hence, the information contained
in these statements seems rather limited.
For the U.S., a further source of information could be Testimonies to the U.S. Congress
given by the Fed Chair. Transcripts for these testimonies are available from July 1996
onwards and, given that the Fed Chair typically testifies to Congress twice a year, this
provides a series of 37 transcripts up to fall 2014 (the end of our sample period). Compared
to ECB press conferences, these testimonies are available at a much lower frequency and the
news component is likely to be smaller. Nonetheless, these speeches still seem interesting for
the following reasons. First, similar to ECB press conferences, these speeches are scheduled
in advance, available in real time, and are closely followed by financial markets. Second,
different from ECB press conferences, these speeches do not concur with FOMC meetings and
thus allow us to measure the effect of tone on asset prices without potentially confounding
effects from actual decisions. For these reasons, we also examine the link between Fed
testimony tone and asset prices in the U.S. in Section 6.
2.2. Measuring the tone of central bank statements
To quantitatively measure CB tone, we prepare the transcripts of ECB press conferences
for the subsequent textual analysis as follows: we (i) convert all words to lower case, (ii)
remove numbers, (iii) remove punctuation, (iv) remove English stop words (e.g., for, very,
and, of, are, etc.), and (v) strip whitespace as is common in the textual analysis literature.
After preparing the text files, we construct a proxy for CB tone using the financial dictionary
developed by Loughran and McDonald (2011). More specifically, we use this dictionary to
identify words that can be classified as negative in financial contexts.7 We then count the
number of negative words in each transcript and compute the ratio of the number of negative
7We only use negative words because the usefulness of positive words for measuring tone is very limited,
as discussed by Loughran and McDonald (2011) and also noted by others before. The main reason is that
positive words are frequently negated. By contrast, negation of negative words is far less common.
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words (N) to the total number of words (T ), N/T . We define CB tone (τ) as
τ = 1−N/T (1)
such that lower values reflect more negative CB tone and higher values imply a more positive
(i.e., less negative) tone. In our empirical analysis, we focus on changes in tone, ∆τ , measured
as the first difference in τ between two subsequent press conference. Accordingly, we interpret
increases in τ as tone becoming more positive and decreases in τ as tone becoming more
negative.8
A few words on this procedure are in order. Our choice of scoring the tone of CB
statements based on the Loughran and McDonald (2011, LM) dictionary is driven mainly
by two considerations. First, we want to rely on a dictionary to classify words as being
negative that is based on prior work and not on our own choice of words being negative or
not. An alternative would be to build our own dictionary of CB language, either based on
just selecting words as being negative based on common sense or based on some statistical
procedure where certain words are classified as being negative based on the market’s reaction
to the occurrence of these words. However, (subjectively) defining a list of negative words
ourselves would essentially mean that we have control over the resulting time series of tone
and, thus, the outcome of our empirical analysis later in the paper. Using a statistical
procedure to generate a negative word list would require us to use the same data twice,
first to build the dictionary and, subsequently, to analyze the effect of tone on asset prices,
thereby leading to a hindsight bias. To avoid such a double usage of the data, we could split
the sample into a training and a test sample but that would significantly reduce the sample
period that we can cover in our empirical analysis. Employing the LM dictionary alleviates
these concerns as we are not using the same data twice and because we have no control over
the (exogenous) list of negative words.
Second, the LM dictionary is explicitly designed to be informative for financial docu-
ments, in contrast to, e.g., the widely used Harvard Dictionary. The LM dictionary was
8Similarly, we may use expressions like “improving tone” or “ameliorating tone” to refer to ∆τ > 0 and
“worsening tone”, “deteriorating tone”, etc. when ∆τ < 0 .
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originally designed for 10-K filings but has proven useful in other financial contexts as well
(see, e.g., Gurun and Butler, 2012; Hillert et al., 2014, for recent papers) and the survey of
Loughran and McDonald (2016) more generally. It seems likely, however, that central bank
language differs from the typical language used in 10-K filings to a certain extent. Such mis-
classification should work against us in our empirical analyses, though, and raise the hurdle
to find a link between tone and asset prices.
Finally, we choose to measure tone by means of simple words counts rather than more
elaborate approaches such as term weighting or topic modelling, because the latter would
require to look ahead through all documents before starting the actual empirical analysis
which would again imply a hindsight bias. Hence, to avoid all these potential biases, we
choose simplicity and transparency over more elaborate alternatives.9
2.3. Identification and timing of returns
In our empirical analysis, we explore how changes in CB tone affect market prices of finan-
cial assets. We now discuss how previous research on monetary policy shocks guides our
identification strategy to gauge the immediacy and persistence of CB tone-related effects on
asset prices.
A standard approach to measuring monetary policy shocks is to compute asset price
changes around monetary policy meetings (see, e.g., Guerkaynak et al., 2005; Hanson and
Stein, 2014, among others). The key idea is that any price reaction in a short time window is
likely to be caused by information about (unexpected) changes in monetary policy and that
this information swamps other information about returns. We rely on this idea when we
compute PC-day price changes to measure the immediate effect of CB tone on asset prices.
Furthermore, we compute changes in asset prices beyond the PC date to assess whether CB
tone has a persistent effect on asset prices. In other words, we analyse whether information
9For the same reason, we do not make use of human scoring techniques, i.e. ask human readers to evaluate
central bank statements. For instance, while a potential advantage of that approach may be that human
readers are better in processing certain nuances of texts, a disadvantage is that human judgement cannot be
avoided in the scoring process, thereby neither guaranteeing an avoidance of misclassification nor ‘reader-
fixed effects’ in tone measures (e.g., Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007). Moreover, it would be difficult to set
up a generic out-of-sample analysis of how central bank tone matters for asset prices, as multiple readers
would have to be trained on a large body of statements.
10
conveyed through CB tone is absorbed by asset prices immediately or whether information
diffuses gradually. Longer-term price changes exclusive of PC-day effects will be informative
in this respect and also alleviate potential concerns about reverse causality. Below, we define
how we measure price changes, specifically their time dimension, to gauge the immediacy
and durability of tone-related effects on asset prices. Figure IA.1 in the Internet Appendix
illustrates the timing convention for PC-day returns and PC-cycle returns.
PC-day returns. To explore the contemporaneous effect of CB tone on stock and bond
markets on a particular PC day t, we compute the one-day equity returns and yield changes
using the closing prices of the day preceding PCt and the day on which PCt takes place. We
denote these PC-day returns by rt.
Returns beyond PC days. To gauge the tone-asset price relation beyond the PC day,
we also compute cumulative returns over k days (starting with the PC day) and denote them
by rt,k. For k = 0, rt,0 just corresponds to the PC-day return rt and for k = 10, for instance,
rt,10 specifies cumulative equity returns and yield changes from the day preceding PCt up to
ten trading days after PCt (i.e. a total of 11 trading days).
PC-cycle returns. When we are interested in returns over the full PC cycle, i.e., returns
from PCt to PCt+1, we use the closing prices of the day preceding PCt and the day preceding
PCt+1. We thereby capture the whole period from one PC up to the next PC but exclude
information only revealed at the day of the next PC. We denote these PC-cycle returns by
rt,t+1. Additionally, we compute returns over PC cycles excluding the PC-day itself. We
measure returns from the closing prices of the day on which PCt takes place to the day
preceding PCt+1 and denote these returns by r
exPCt
t,t+1 . Given that r
exPCt
t,t+1 only reflects the
information content of CB-tone for non-PC days, this measure is more akin to an out-of-
sample perspective and alleviates potential concerns about reverse causality.
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2.4. Econometric setup
Before exploring the asset price effect of CB tone, we check more generally whether changes
in asset prices are systematically different on days when press conferences take place relative
to other days in our sample. We use the following dummy regression setup for daily price
changes rs,
rs = b
noPC ×DnoPCs + b
PC ×DPCs + us, (2)
where DPCs = 1 (D
noPC
s = 0) on days when a press conference takes place and D
PC
s = 0
(DnoPCs = 1) otherwise. The coefficient-estimates for b
noPC and bPC correspond to the mean
price changes on non-PC and PC days, respectively. This setup allows to use standard t- and
F -tests to assess whether coefficients are significantly different from zero and significantly
different from each other, i.e. to check for a PC-day effect.10
To evaluate the effect of CB tone on asset prices, we run regressions of ri on measures
of tone changes, where ri represents either an equity return or yield (factor) change with
i specifying the timing convention discussed above, ri ∈ {rt, rt,k, rt,t+1, r
exPCt
t,t+1 }. To compare
mean returns on PC days when CB tone becomes more positive (indicated by ∆τ > 0) to
returns when tone becomes more negative (∆τ < 0), we run the dummy regression
ri = b
∆τ>0 ×D∆τ>0t + b
∆τ<0 ×D∆τ<0t + ui (3)
and test for the significance of differences in asset price changes conditional on improving or
deteriorating CB tone. As a related exercise, we regress ri on the sign of tone changes,
ri = a+ b× sign [∆τt−1,t] + ut. (4)
to test for a general effect of more positive or negative tone on asset prices. Finally, to assess
whether the magnitude of the tone change matters for asset prices beyond its sign, we regress
10A recent literature shows that FOMC meetings in the U.S. have a strong effect on U.S. stock returns at
the day of the meeting (Lucca and Moench, 2015) and even weeks after a meeting (Cieslak et al., 2016).
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returns on tone changes,
ri = a+ b×∆τt−1,t + ut. (5)
Following this setup, we present empirical results for the relation of changes in CB tone
to returns in equity markets and changes in government yield curves using the data described
in the next section.
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this section, we describe the data that we use in our empirical analysis to gauge the
relation between central bank tone and asset prices. We first present descriptive statistics
for CB tone and then move on to describe the asset price data used in our empirical analysis.
3.1. ECB press conferences: Descriptive statistics
The ECB makes transcripts of its press conferences publicly available on its website.11 We
obtain these transcripts, starting with the introduction of the Euro, for a total of 185 press
conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. From these transcripts, we extract
the opening statement of the ECB president and process the text as described in Section
2.2.
Table I presents some descriptives statistics, first showing that ECB press conferences
take place regularly but not at equidistant intervals. The average PC cycle is around 22
trading days, with the range spanning 10 to 50 days for the shortest and longest intervals,
respectively. The second column summarizes statistics for the ratio of the number of negative
words to the number of total words (N/T ), which we use to compute the tone measure defined
in Equation (1). On average, the ratio of negative to total words is around 2.7% but it is
associated with substantial variability within the range of 0.4% and 5.7%. The third column
presents the properties of tone changes, ∆τ , measured as difference in tone between two
subsequent PCs in percentage points. Tone changes are close to zero on average and at the
11See, for instance, the following link for transcripts of all ECB press conferences held in 2014: ECB Press
Conferences in 2014.
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median but show substantial variation in the range from -2.4% to +2% points and exhibit
significant first-order autocorrelation over our sample period. Of the 184 ECB tone changes
in our sample, we find that tone increases at 100 press conferences and deteriorates in 84
cases.
Figure 1 plots the time series of ECB tone, τ , and changes in ECB tone, ∆τ . The grey
vertical lines mark the dates of the ECB press conferences. Panel (a) shows that ECB tone
reaches its minimum at the end of 2008/beginning of 2009 during the financial crisis and
Panel (b) illustrates the volatility of tone changes over time.
An interesting exercise is to take a closer look at the words that drive our measure of
tone and Table II provides some insights in this respect. First, we present a list of the 20
negative words (as classified by Loughran and McDonald, 2011) with the highest number of
occurrences across all ECB press conference statements and find that the most frequently
used negative word-stems are “weak”, “decline”, and “imbalances”.12 To see whether certain
negative words are recurrently used in specific contexts, we also present frequency counts for
bigrams and trigrams (i.e. sequences of two and three adjacent words). While, for instance,
the general notion of “global imbalances” seems to be a recurring theme, the much lower
frequency counts for bi- and trigrams suggest that our measure of ECB tone captures how
the ECB interprets and judges developments rather than hard facts associated with specific
monetary policy, financial market, or macroeconomic topics. We provide more evidence in
this respect in Section 5 where we show that our measure of CB tone is not related to
macroeconomic fundamentals.
3.2. Asset price data
This section summarizes the data on equity prices and government bonds that we use in our
core empirical analysis. Other financial market variables and macroeconomic data used for
supplementary analyses are introduced in the corresponding Sections along with the results.
The Internet Appendix provides details about the sources and corresponding identifiers for
12These counts are based on aggregating words by their word-stem; for example, the 361 occurrences
we summarize for “weak” are the sum of occurrences for “weak” (166), “weaken” (6), “weakened” (18),
“weakening” (47), “weaker” (78), “weakness” (44), and “weaknesses” (2).
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all data (see Section IA.A).
Equities. We obtain daily data on equity indexes for the sample period covered by ECB
press conferences, that is from January 1999 to October 2014. To explore the overall effect on
EMU equity markets, we use the EuroStoxx 50 index (denoted “ESX50”) which contains the
50 largest firms from the Eurozone.13 We also use data on the MSCI EMU index (denoted
“MSCI”) that includes all countries that have adopted the Euro, accounting for the evolving
membership of countries. The MSCI index has a broader coverage than the ESX50 and also
includes smaller firms. Additionally, we use the MSCI sub-indices that specifically cover
value- and growth stocks in the Eurozone, MSCI EMU Value (denoted “Value”) and MSCI
EMU Growth (denoted “Growth”). For our analysis on the individual country level, we
include all EMU-members that have been covered by MSCI country indexes throughout
our sample period: with the exception of Luxembourg, this includes the other ten of the
eleven original member states: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. In our benchmark empirical analyses, we will look at
simple stock returns (based on total return indices) and not excess returns since we do not
want to confound the effect of tone on returns and yields. We provide robustness on this
in Section 5.4 where we also report results for excess returns and find that our results are
robust.
Term structure of government bond yields. To explore the effect of ECB tone on
government bond markets we use the term structure of German yields (available from the
Bundesbank) which is available over our full sample period. European yield data are avail-
able from the ECB but cover a substantially shorter sample from 2004 to 2014. However,
the German yield curve is highly correlated with the ECB AAA yield curve over the period
September 2004 to October 2014 where both data sets are available, providing virtually
identically results in our empirical analysis for the period of joint coverage. The high cor-
13Furthermore, there is a liquid market for options on the ESX50 and the VSTOXX, a volatility index
constructed from ESX50 options. The VSTOXX is a common measure of Eurozone option-implied stock
volatility (see, e.g., Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2014).
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relation reflections the fact that the Germany is the largest EMU member state, subject to
comparably very low sovereign risk, and is typically perceived as the engine of the EMU
economy. As a consequence, German yields are viewed as a benchmark against which other
EMU government yield curves are referenced. This line of reasoning follows that of earlier
research that attributes a lead role to Germany, some already even prior to the introduction
of the Euro during the existence of the European Monetary System (EMS) and the Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM); see e.g. di Giovanni et al. (2009) and the references therein. We
therefore use daily data of German government bond yields with maturities ranging from
one to 20 years provided by Deutsche Bundesbank from January 1999 to October 2014.
4. ECB Tone and Equity Returns
In this section, we document a strong link between Eurozone stock prices and the tone of
ECB press conference statements. A more positive (negative) tone compared to the previous
press conference is associated with positive (negative) equity returns on the day of the press
conference. These effects persist and strengthen over the cycle to the next conference and
also hold for individual Euro-country equity markets.
4.1. Do ECB press conferences move equity markets?
As discussed above, ECB press conferences take place on Thursdays in the early afternoon
(14:30 CET) so that any new information revealed during the press conference can affect
equity prices on the same day. To assess whether ECB tone does affect stock prices, we first
look at PC-day equity returns, i.e., the return from the trading close of the preceding day
to the trading close of the press conference day. Figure 2 previews our main findings. Panel
(a) shows that stock returns are close to zero across all PC days, i.e., there is no general
PC-day effect akin to the FOMC effect documented by Lucca and Moench (2015).14 At the
same time, we find that returns on all four indices are negative on PC days when ECB tone
14More generally, Savor and Wilson (2013, 2014) show that asset prices (stocks, bonds, currencies) behave
very differently on days with scheduled U.S. macro news announcements and that risky assets earn higher
returns on announcement days.
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becomes more negative compared to the previous PC (Panel b) and positive on PC days
when tone becomes more positive (Panel c). The differential in average returns on PC days
with positive and negative tone changes suggests that ECB tone affects stock markets and
that this effect is very similar for large stocks (ESX50), all stocks (MSCI), as well as value
and growth stocks.
Table III presents detailed regression results on the relation between tone changes and
stock returns. We start by comparing equity market returns on PC days versus non-PC
days, and Panel A shows that average ESX50 returns on non-PC and PC days are 1 bp
(basis point) and −3 bp, respectively. Neither of these returns is statistically different from
zero, and standard tests show that equity returns on PC compared to non-PC days are also
not significantly different from each other. The same finding obtains for the MSCI index and
value and growth stocks. Hence, stock returns are not unusually high or low on PC days
(unlike the results for the U.S., see e.g. Lucca and Moench, 2015).
Instead, the return plots presented above suggest that stock returns on PC days are very
different depending on whether the tone of the ECB becomes more positive or negative.
Panel B of Table III shows that these large return differentials are significantly different
from zero based on a standard F -test. On PC days with more positive tone, equity returns
range from +19 bp (value stocks) to 26 bp (ESX50 and growth stocks) whereas a more
negative tone is associated with equity returns of −38 bp (ESX50) to −35 bp (growth).
These differences of around 60 bp are statistically significant and sizeable from an economic
point of view: In a year with twelve press conferences, an average PC-day difference of 60
bp annualizes to about 7% p.a. which is of the order of the equity premium.
To evaluate the impact of positive versus negative tone changes on equity returns in
more depth, we run sign regressions as specified in Equation (4), and present the results
in Panel C. The estimates of the intercept a are not different from zero, confirming that
there is no pure PC day-effect. The estimates of b are significantly positive and suggest that
stock returns are about 30 bp higher or lower depending on whether tone becomes more
positive or more negative, respectively. The R2s are in the range of 3% to 4% and suggest
sizeable explanatory power of ECB tone changes for the daily equity returns around press
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conferences. To take the magnitude of tone changes into account, we regress equity returns
on tone changes, see the specification in Equation (5), and report very similar results in
Panel D. To give an economic interpretation to the estimated b-coefficients, recall that the
standard deviation of tone changes is around 0.80 (see Table I). Hence, a one-sigma increase
in tone translates into an ESX50 return of around 30 bp.
Given these results, it seems safe to conclude that changes in tone move equity markets.
A natural next step is to investigate whether this effect is confined to PC days or whether
it persists beyond to see how quickly tone changes are incorporated into prices.
4.2. Equity returns over ECB press conference cycles
As a first step in our analysis of tone changes and equity returns beyond PC days, we plot
average cumulative k-day returns (defined as rt,k in Section 2.3) conditional on the last
tone change being positive or negative in Figure 3. Panel (a) shows that the initial tone-
related return differential (corresponding to k=0) persists beyond the PC day and widens
over the next 15 trading days. Panel (b) of Figure 3 underpins the statistical significance of
the relation between ECB tone changes and subsequent equity returns by presenting slope
coefficients from regressions of cumulative k-day returns on preceding tone changes, along
with 90% confidence bands. These plots confirm that the ECB tone-stock return link persists
and strengthens over time. A one-sigma change in tone is associated with a stock return
of more than 1% within the next three trading weeks, thereby suggesting that ECB tone
conveys information to markets that is relevant beyond the PC day itself. This finding also
makes it unlikely that the results for PC days documented above are due to simple short-
term (liquidity) effects which would be associated with a reversion in equity prices and not
a drift in the same direction.
To assess the link between tone changes and subsequent equity returns over full PC
cycles, we regress the PC-to-PC equity returns (the “PC-cycle return” denoted by rt,t+1 in
Section 2.3) on tone changes. More precisely, for press conferences taking place at times
t and t + 1, we compute the return from the closing price on the day before PCt to the
closing price on the day before PCt+1. These returns capture the market impact of PCt but
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exclude the impact of PCt+1. The regression results in Panel A of Table IV show that slope
coefficients for tone changes are all significantly positive and that R2s are around 3%–3.5%.
The estimated bs imply that a one-sigma tone change translates into an average PC-cycle
return of about ± 100 basis points.
We repeat this PC-cycle exercise but now exclude the PCt day return itself, by computing
the return from the close on the day at which PCt takes place to the close price on the day
prior to PCt+1, denoted by r
exPC
t,t+1 in Section 2.3. By excluding the direct impact of the
PC day, we can test whether returns are significantly related to tone changes after the PC
day as well, i.e. when the contemporaneous correlation between tone changes and PC-day
returns is removed. The results in Panel B of Table IV suggest that the estimates of b remain
significant, albeit at a lower level, and this similarly applies to the regression R2s. Overall,
these results corroborate that tone changes have a lasting effect on equity prices and have
predictive ability for stock returns throughout PC cycles, even when excluding the PC day
effect itself. In other words, CB tone conveys information that is gradually incorporated into
prices over the cycle to the next press conference.
Dissecting stock returns. To better understand the economic significance of our re-
sults, we dissect cumulative equity returns based on regimes with positive and negative tone
changes. The first row in Panel C of Table IV presents cumulative returns over all 4,076
trading days in our sample as the arithmetic sum of daily returns (“simple”) as well as
cumulative geometric returns to account for compounding effects (“comp.”). For the four
equity indices used in our analysis, cumulative simple and compound returns in EMU equity
markets are in the range of 28.37% to 52.99% and −10.94% to 10.44%, respectively. Next,
we dissect the sample into the 2,264 days for which the most recent ECB tone change was
positive and the 1,812 days for which the most recent tone change was negative. The results
show that cumulative simple (compound) stock returns are in the range of to 55.70% to
89.72% (43.00% to 92.41%) when the most recent tone change was positive whereas cumula-
tive stock returns are in the range of −36.73% to −27.33% (−42.71% to −35.42%) when the
most recent tone change was negative. These results demonstrate that EMU equity markets
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earn all of their cumulative returns during times associated with more optimistic ECB tone
and that stock prices fall during periods following ECB press conferences with deteriorating
tone.
Panel D reports the results of repeating this exercise in a generic out-of-sample setup by
excluding returns of all PC days. These results confirm the strikingly distinct performance
of EMU equity markets conditional on preceding ECB tone changes.
On the whole, our results suggest that changes in CB tone have a strong effect on equity
returns over PC cycles, beyond returns generated on PC days. More generally, throughout
our sample period, we find that all of the cumulative stock market performance is earned
after positive ECB tone changes whereas negative tone changes are followed by negative (or
zero) returns on average.
4.3. Individual country equity returns
We now turn to individual EMU member country stock markets and examine all countries
for which MSCI provides coverage of comparable country indexes for the full sample period.
Our sample of MSCI country indices contains 10 of the 11 original EMU member countries
(all except Luxembourg) and we find that results are very similar across all countries. Figure
4 shows that average PC day returns are relatively small (i.e., there is no PC-day effect)
but that PC-day returns are significantly different on days with more positive compared
to more negative ECB tone. Panels A and B of Table V show that the these findings are
statistically significant, except for Austria where the PC day differential of about 35 bp is
associated with a p-value of 0.12. Panel C reports results for regressions of stock returns on
tone changes on PC days and we find that the estimated slope coefficients are all positive
and range from 0.24 (Ireland) to 0.70 (Finland). R2s range from 1.08% (Ireland) to 4.19%
(Finland). Overall, the estimated slope coefficients and R2s are close to the values we found
for the aggregate European stock market indexes above. Finally, Panel D reports results for
regressions of returns on tone changes over the full PC cycle and shows that the link between
tone changes and stock returns is not limited to the PC day itself but extends to the days
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after a press conference.
Overall, our results show that ECB tone conveys information for stock returns in the
EMU as a whole but also for individual EMU-member stock markets. This also suggests
that tone might be a driver of EMU stock market co-movement.
4.4. Controlling for predictability of tone and monetary policy shocks
Before exploring the channels through which central bank tone matters for equity prices in
the next section, we provide evidence that changes in tone contain information for stock
markets beyond a standard measure of monetary policy shocks and after controlling for
predictability of tone itself. More specifically, we run augmented PC-day and PC-cycle
regressions for ESX50 returns (ri) based on the specification
ri,t = a+ b1∆τt−1,t + b2∆τt−2,t−1 + γ∆i
1y
t + ut,
where ∆τt−1,t denotes the change in tone from the previous press conferences (as in the above
specifications), ∆τt−2,t−1 is the lagged tone change, and ∆i
1y
t is the change in the 1-year yield
of (German) government bonds.15 We add lagged tone changes to control for the negative
autocorrelation in ∆τ reported in Table I so that the coefficient b1 more closely measures
the effect of tone surprises. By adding ∆i1yt to the regression to control for monetary policy
shocks, we follow previous research that defines monetary policy shocks as changes in short-
term government bond yields around policy meetings.
Table VI reports the results for the PC-day and PC-cycle regressions in the left and
right part of the Table, respectively. Specification (i) corresponds to ESX50 tone regressions
reported in Tables III and IV . In specification (ii), we add lagged tone changes and find that
accounting for the serial correlation in tone changes does not overturn our finding that CB
tone matters for stock prices on PC days and over PC cycles. Since estimates of b1 remain
virtually unchanged compared to specification (i), these results suggest that unexpected tone
shocks matter for stock prices, rather than the predictable component of tone changes.
15Using MSCI returns instead of ESX50 returns does not change the findings reported below.
21
Finally, specification (iii) shows that additionally controlling for monetary policy shocks
(through ∆i1yt ) has only a small impact on estimates of b1 and does not render tone shocks
insignificant. Since we also find that estimates of γ are significantly different from zero and
that adding ∆i1yt approximately doubles the R-squared, these results suggest that equity-
relevant information conveyed by tone changes is different from that captured by monetary
policy shocks.
On the whole, all our empirical findings so far provide strong evidence that ECB tone
contains price-relevant information for EMU equity markets. In the next section, we discuss
the potential channels through which central bank tone may matter for stock prices.
5. Why does central bank tone matter for asset prices?
Our results above suggest that there is a significant link between changes in central bank tone
and stock returns. In this section, we explore possible channels through which tone might
affect equity prices by studying the relation of tone changes to prices of other financial
assets and to macroeconomic fundamentals. Based on our findings that tone matters for the
government yield curve, credit spreads, and equity (option-implied) market volatility but is
unrelated to macro fundamentals, we conclude that central bank tone affects asset prices
through a risk-taking channel.
5.1. Central bank tone and the term structure of government yields
One channel through which tone changes could affect equity markets is that CBs use com-
munication to actively manage the market’s expectation about future interest rates and that
equity prices simply react to changing (expectations about) interest rates via discount rates.
Hence, we now examine the link between tone and Eurozone government bond markets, using
the term structure of German yields for maturities of one to 20 years provided by Deutsche
Bundesbank as proxy for the EMU term structure of yields. We find that tone matters for
the shape of the yield curve on PC days and over PC cycles, generally leading to an increase
(decrease) in yield levels and curvature if tone becomes more positive (more negative). These
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findings are in line with the notion that CB communication aims for managing interest rate
expectations but also suggest that the link between tone and equity prices uncovered above
is unlikely to be due to a simple discount rate effect as more positive tone is associated with
higher equity prices and higher yields.
Yield curve changes on press conference days We present results for each of the
twenty individual yields as well as for a parsimonious three factor characterization of the
yield curve by its level, slope, and curvature that we estimate by a principal components
analysis (see Litterman and Scheinkman, 1991). The level factor captures the average level
of yields, slope captures the difference between long and short maturity yields, and curvature
captures the difference between long and short maturities relative to medium-term maturities
(i.e., the curvature factor is low when the yield curve is hump-shaped).
We start by comparing PC days to non-PC days. In contrast to equity markets, we
find that there is a pronounced PC day-effect for bond yields (see Panel A in Figure 5):
Unconditional yield changes on non-PC days are negative, small in magnitude, and very
similar across maturities, which just reflects generally decreasing interest rates over our
sample period. By contrast, on PC days, all yields increase and more so for longer as
compared to shorter maturities. One interpretation of this slope effect with the full yield
curve shifting upwards may be that markets generally expect more easing before the PC
compared to the actual outcome at the Governor Council’s meeting such that yields tended
to increase after the PC statement. Panel A of Table VII confirms the significant increase
in the level and in the slope of the yield curve compared on PC compared to non-PC days.
When we separate PC days with positive and negative tone changes, we see a similar slope
effect for both, but the level of yield changes is significantly different across all maturities
(Panel (b) in Figure 5): when ECB tone becomes more positive, all yields increase and
more so for longer maturities. When ECB tone becomes more negative, yields of shorter
maturities decrease whereas yields of longer maturities increase on average. Panel B of Table
VII shows that, as a consequence, the level of yields significantly increases on PC days with
positive tone changes but is not affected when tone becomes more negative, which results in
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a significant difference. The slope effect is also only significant for positive tone changes but
the difference compared to negative tone changes is not significant.
Regressing yield (factor) changes on the signs of tone changes (Panel (c) in Figure 5
and Panel C in Table VII), shows that the sign of tone changes affects yield across all
maturities. In regressions using the yield factors, the slope coefficient is significant for yield
level (with an R2 of 4.59%) but not for slope and curvature. Moreover, the PC day-effects
(independent of the signs of tone changes) manifest themselves through significant estimates
of the intercepts a for the yield curve’s level and slope. When taking the magnitude of tone
changes into account by regressing yield (factor) changes on tone changes, ECB tone does
not appear to matter much beyond PC-day effects captured by the intercepts a (Panel D in
Table VII). Taking a look at Panel (d) in Figure 5, however, reveals that changes in yields
with maturities of up to three years are significantly related to changes in ECB tone, which is
consistent with the view that central banks control the short end of the yield curve (Blinder
et al., 2008).
Yield curves over press conference cycles Moving from PC days to PC cycles, we find
an even stronger relation between bond yields and ECB tone changes. However, the nature
of this relationship is quite different from the one discussed above for PC days. So far, we
have documented that tone changes on the PC day almost exclusively matter for the level
of the yield curve. Over the full PC cycle, however, we find that tone changes are related to
both the level and curvature. Panel (a) in Figure 6 shows that PCs with a more negative
tone are followed by a drop in the yield level and a pronounced inverted hump around shorter
to medium-term maturities. The opposite pattern obtains for positive tone changes. Panel
A in Table VIII shows that these tone-related differences in curvature are highly significant.
When we run regressions of yield (factor) changes on changes in ECB tone, we find that
the relation becomes stronger over PC cycles as compared to PC days. Panel (b) in Figure 6
shows that term structure of b-estimates exhibits a hump-shape as well and that coefficients
are significantly different from zero for yield maturities up to seven years. The corresponding
results in Panel B of Table VIII show that the effect of tone on level and curvature is highly
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significant with R2s of 2.17% and 6.04%, respectively. Thus, more positive CB tone is
associated with a higher level and a more pronounced hump (i.e., more negative curvature)
of the yield curve over the PC cycle.
Overall, our results indicate that CB tone changes matter for the level of yields on PC
days and for the level and curvature of the yield curve over PC cycles. These results are
largely consistent with our results for equities above. A more positive tone drives up both
yields and equity prices and can thus be viewed as signalling “better times” for the economy.
Moreover our findings appear consistent with the notion that changes in curvature reflect
expected changes in risk premia (e.g., Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2008). We provide more
evidence for such a risk-based channel below.
The results reported above show that our measure of central bank tone τ contains infor-
mation for stock prices and government bond yield curves. While we have already provided
some evidence that τ does not seem to be driven by specific contextual statements, we now
provide further evidence indicating that τ contains generic information for asset prices that
is not subsumed by macroeconomic or financial market variables. These results suggest
that τ does not simply reflect an aggregation of macro fundamentals and that the extent
to which tone changes may be driven by the ECB reacting to market conditions is limited.
Instead, we provide evidence that the effect of tone changes on asset prices is consistent with
a risk-taking channel of monetary policy.
5.2. Real-time economic activity, growth, and sentiment
A plausible mechanism for central bank tone to affect asset prices could be that it conveys
information about economic fundamentals. In other words, the central bank may act as an
aggregator of news about macroeconomic activity and our tone measure may be driven by
the central bank’s view on the state of the business cycle. Such a channel would be consistent
with our finding that more positive tone is associated with increases in equity prices as well
as in government bond yields.
Beber et al. (2015) construct macroeconomic indices that track the state of the economy
along different dimensions in real-time. Specifically, the provide real-time measures for eco-
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nomic activity (“Econ”), economic growth (“Growth”), and economic sentiment (“Sent”).16
To explore whether there is a macro-channel that links central bank tone and asset prices, we
regress changes in the real-time economic on contemporaneous and lagged changes in ECB
tone. Panel A of Table IX shows that changes in the real-time economic indices over a PC
cycle are neither related to contemporaneous tone changes (left) nor can they be predicted
by tone changes over the previous cycle (right). None of the slope coefficients is signifi-
cantly different from zero and R2s are very low. Panel B reports qualitatively similar results
when we investigate whether tone changes predict future changes in real-time macro activity,
growth or sentiment over (fixed) horizons ranging from 5 to 250 days. Finding that tone
changes are virtually unrelated to current and future macroeconomic conditions, it seems
unlikely that central bank tone matters for stock prices and government yields through a
macro-information channel. These findings also support our interpretation of Table II (see
Section 3.1) that tone changes are not driven by ‘hard information’. In the same vein, we
provide additional evidence that there is only a weak relation between ECB tone and survey
expectations of macroeconomic fundamentals (see Section 5.4 below).
5.3. A risk-based channel?
Our empirical results so far show that tone changes are largely unrelated to economic fun-
damentals and that positive tone changes are associated with increases in stock prices and
bond yields. These findings rule out a channel where stock prices increase because a more
positive tone is associated with lower interest rates or higher growth expectations. Below,
we provide evidence that our results are in line with a channel where tone affects risk premia
embedded in market prices (see, e.g., Shiller et al., 1983; Hanson and Stein, 2014; Morris
and Shin, 2014; Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Hattori et al., 2015).
If central bank tone affects asset prices through a risk-based channel, we should find that
tone changes specifically matter for assets that are particularly sensitive to changes in risk
aversion. Based on this rationale, we investigate the link between central bank tone and
16We are grateful to the authors for providing us with their data on real-time indices for the Euro area.
For details on the construction of the indices see Beber et al. (2015). The general idea is to apply a principal
components analysis to macro news surprises; the sentiment index is based on survey expectations.
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corporate credit spreads, measured as the yield differential of BBB-rated and AAA-rated
bonds; this yield spread directly measures the compensation for risk that investors demand
for holding bonds with low compared to high credit quality.
Figure 7 shows that changes in credit spreads are inversely related to tone changes, i.e.,
that the BBB-AAA-spread decreases (increases) when central bank tone becomes more pos-
itive (negative). The credit spread differential accumulating over the 15 days after the latest
press conference is approximately 10 basis points (Panel a) and the regression results (Panel
b) suggest that the link between credit spread and tone changes is statistically significant.
These findings are consistent with the view that central bank tone affects asset prices through
a risk-based channel.
Next, we explore how changes in CB tone affect stock market volatility implied by equity
options, akin to previous papers showing that option-implied volatility is linked to monetary
policy (see, e.g., Bekaert et al., 2013; Hattori et al., 2015). We measure market-implied
expected volatility from the VSTOXX, a volatility index constructed from ESX50 options,
which has become a benchmark measure for Eurozone equity market volatility (similar to
the VIX for the U.S.). First, we use the VSTOXX sub-indices for eight maturities ranging
from one month to two years to illustrate the relation between ECB tone and market-implied
volatility. Figure 8 presents results from regressing changes in implied volatility at different
horizons on changes in ECB tone. We find that all slope coefficients are negative, with
results becoming statistically more significant for options with longer maturities, both, for
volatility changes on PC days as well as over PC cycles. From an economic perspective, our
findings suggest that more positive (negative) tone is associated with decreasing (increasing)
volatility expectations, consistent with the notion the changes in tone affect the risk-appetite
of market participants.
To provide more explicit evidence for this notion, we follow Bekaert et al. (2013) and
decompose the VSTOXX into proxies for uncertainty and risk aversion. We estimate uncer-
tainty as the conditional stock market variance, obtained from regressing realized variance
(RV AR) on lagged VSTOXX2 and lagged realized variance. The proxy for risk aversion is
the regression-implied variance risk premium. More specifically, we implement the approach
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of Bekaert et al. (2013, see Equation (1) in their article) by running a regression on daily
data and obtain
RV ARt,t+22d = 0.0003 + 0.6318 · V STOXX
2
t + 0.1643 ·RV ARt−22d,t + et.
The fitted values from this regression (R̂V ARt) provide us with a time series of conditional
variance, which serves as our measure of uncertainty.17 The variance risk premium implied
by this regression, i.e. the difference in Q- and P-measure expected variance, which serves
as our proxy for risk aversion is given by V RPt = V STOXX
2
t − R̂V ARt.
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Table X presents regression results which show that risk aversion is significantly related
to changes in ECB tone whereas uncertainty is not. More specifically, changes in uncertainty
and risk aversion are both negatively related to tone changes, implying that a more positive
tone is associated with lower uncertainty and lower risk aversion. While the slope coeffi-
cient for uncertainty is not different from zero, we find that market-implied risk aversion
significantly decreases (increases) when ECB tone becomes more positive (negative) with
associated R2s in excess of 5%.
In sum, our results reported in the this and the previous sections suggest that central
bank tone matters for the prices of stocks and other financial assets by affecting risk premia
embedded in market prices. When tone becomes more positive, the risk aversion of market
participants decreases, which results in an increase of stock prices and government bond
yields as well as in a decrease of corporate credit spreads and equity option-implied market
volatility.
5.4. Additional results and robustness checks
This section summarizes the results of various additional empirical exercises, for which we
report detailed results in the Internet Appendix.
17The R2 of this regression is 49.74% and the coefficient estimates on V STOXX2t and RV ARt−22d,t are
significant at the 1% and 10% level, respectively, as judged by Newey and West (1987) standard errors.
18Bekaert et al. (2013) also discuss the rationale for using the variance risk premium as a proxy for risk
aversion by referencing different types of models in which risk aversion and the variance risk premium are
directly related to each other.
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ECB tone and policy rates We now explore the relation between ECB tone and key
interest rates that the ECB sets for the euro area. First, the interest rate on main refinancing
operations (MRO), which are essential in providing liquidity to the banking system. Second,
the rate on the deposit facility, which banks use for overnight deposits. Third, the rate on
the marginal lending facility, which banks use for overnight credit.19 More specifically, we
test whether the (cumulative) changes in these key interest rates over the cycle from the
press conference at time t to the next press conference at t+1 are significantly related to the
ECB tone change revealed at time t. In these regressions, we also control for lagged policy
rate changes to account for the standard practice of central banks to change interest rates
in multiple small steps (“interest rate smoothing”) which leads to autocorrelation of policy
rate changes. The regression results reported in Table IA.1 suggest that the link between
changes in ECB tone and policy rates is positive, similar to our results for government bond
yields reported above, and that this relation remains significant even after controlling for
policy rate changes over previous PC cycles.
Controlling for actual policy changes We also check whether excluding PC days with
actual changes in policy rates and/or announcements of unconventional monetary policy
measures affects our main findings. We find that excluding these days does not matter much
for the link between tone and stock returns, in the sense that controlling for policy actions
taken by the ECB does not render the role of tone insignificant. More specifically, we repeat
our regressions of stock returns and yield changes on tone changes for a subsample that
excludes press conferences, at which the ECB changes at least one of the three policy rates,
and present the results Figures IA.2 and IA.3. We repeat the same analysis and additionally
exclude days with unconventional monetary policy (UMP) announcements and report these
results in Figures IA.4 and IA.5 in the Internet Appendix.20 While the statistical significance
of our estimates decreases slightly compared to the full sample estimates, their magnitudes
19These rates move in lockstep for most parts of our sample (and, hence, do not really offer independent
information) but we include all three rates here for completeness.
20For a detailed study of unconventional ECB policies, see, e.g., Krishnamurthy et al. (2015).
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and economic significance are essentially unchanged.21 Overall, these results corroborate our
conclusions on the relation between tone changes, equity returns, and the yield curve.
Survey expectations of macroeconomic fundamentals Our results in Section 5.2
suggest that changes in current and future economic fundamentals are not significantly re-
lated to changes in ECB tone. We now complement these findings by studying the link
between ECB tone and expectations about economic fundamentals. Using survey data on
a range of macro variables, taken from Consensus Economics for Germany, France, Italy,
the Netherlands, and Spain, we do not find an unambiguous link between changes in sur-
vey expectations and changes in ECB tone.22 The regression results in Table IA.2 suggest
that for the 50 country/fundamental combinations only four are significantly related to
ECB tone changes: unemployment for Germany, industrial production for France, GDP and
consumption growth for Spain. While some other regression coefficients exhibit marginal sig-
nificance, there is no particular cross-country pattern in the link between ECB tone changes
and changes in survey expectations about GDP growth, consumption growth, industrial pro-
duction, inflation, wages and unemployment. Most interestingly, survey expectations about
short- and long-term interest rates at horizons of three months and one year appear to be
unrelated to ECB tone changes in all countries.
Tone “reaction functions”? In the spirit of the central bank literature on policy rules
and reaction functions, we now study whether ECB tone changes simply reflect recent market
conditions and whether the ECB can be viewed as following a reaction function to adjust
its tone in response to such developments.23 Table IA.3 reports results for regressions of
21Given that the economic magnitudes are almost the same as in the full sample estimation, somewhat
lower statistical significant apparently results from the comparably lower number of observations that is
available for this subsample analysis.
22Consensus economics conducts surveys among financial and economic forecasters towards the end of the
month. While the data only reports the publication date of the survey results (which is in the first half of
the subsequent month), our aim is to capture expectations when surveys are actually conducted. Hence,
Table IA.2 reports results for setting the date to five business days before the end of the month. Results are
very similar when shifting the date to the end of the month or ten days before the end of the month.
23There is a large literature that investigates whether central banks that follow some form of policy rule,
like inflation targeting, should respond to asset price changes or asset price volatility at all and, if so, how
(see, e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1999, 2001; Gilchrist and Leahy, 2002).
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tone changes on potential drivers of such a reaction function. As candidate variables, we
consider lagged changes in the level, slope, and curvature of the yield curve, lagged stock
returns (ESX50), lagged changes in (market expectations of) equity volatility (VSTOXX),
and lagged changes in the real-time indices of Beber et al. (2015).24 To avoid look-ahead
biases, we set the timing such that we regress tone changes from one PC to the next on
changes in the independent variables measured from the day after the previous PC to the
day before the current PC. Interestingly, we find that the lagged change in yield curvature
is the only significant driver of tone changes, whereas all other variables appear unrelated
to future tone changes. Since changes in yield curvature only explain a small portion of the
time-series variation in tone changes, and other variables do not seem to have any predictive
ability at all, our results suggest that ECB tone mainly conveys information beyond recent
market developments.
Unexpected changes in ECB tone Given that our measure of tone changes exhibits
significant autocorrelation (see Table I in 3.1), one could argue that tone changes are pre-
dictable to some extent. We showed above in Table VI that controlling for lagged tone
changes does not affect our main conclusion. Another way of showing this is to generate a
series of serially uncorrelated ‘tone shocks’, by estimating an AR(1) process for ECB tone
changes and then repeating our main empirical analyses for stock returns by using the resid-
uals of the AR(1) process instead of tone changes themselves.25 Using these AR(1) residuals
rather than the tone changes themselves does not change our conclusions, as we show in
more detail in the Internet Appendix for equity returns (see Figure IA.6) and yield changes
(see Figure IA.7).
Equity excess returns We also repeat the empirical analysis of how ECB tone affects
stock prices using equity excess returns instead of raw returns. As a proxy for the risk-
24For the data of Beber et al. (2015), we only include the real-time economic activity and sentiment index
as the growth index is highly correlated with the economic activity index and including them jointly leads
to multicollinearity problems.
25Using AR(1) residuals is equivalent to controlling for lagged tone changes but it allows us to present our
results in a simple graphical way, comparable to the results in our main analysis.
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free rate, we use the 3-month interbank rate for the Eurozone (Datastream Mnemonic
BBEUR3M). Using equity excess returns, our conclusions remain unchanged. In the In-
ternet Appendix, Figure IA.8 reveals patterns that are very similar to those displayed in
Figure 3 above. On PC-days, there is an excess return differential depending on whether
the ECB tone change is positive or negative. This differential wides on the days after the
PC and regressing equity excess returns on tone changes yields significantly positive slope
estimates.
6. Fed tone and U.S. asset prices
Using a setup that is very different compared to the ECB press conferences explored above,
we now provide evidence that central bank tone also matters for asset prices in the U.S.
Specifically, we use data on the Fed Chair’s Testimonies to the U.S. Congress, typically
taking place twice a year with the Chair testifying to the U.S. House of Representatives and
to the U.S. Senate on two subsequent days, in both cases delivering identical remarks. Given
that the frequency of these testimonies is low and that the testimony dates do not concur
with policy meetings of the Fed, the news component embedded in the Chair’s should be
comparably small.26
Measuring the tone of the Fed Chair’s testimony provides an interesting setup for at least
three reasons. First, it allows us to check the robustness of our main results for a different
country and different central bank. Second, the testimony is an event that is not tied to
actual monetary policy decisions (e.g., unlike the FOMC meeting) so that there should be no
potential for confounding effects from actions and tone. Third, and despite the differences
mentioned before, other important features of the testimony are similar to the ECB press
conferences studied above. These common features include the fact that the testimony is
a scheduled event that market participants are aware of well before it takes place, that the
26As detailed in Section 2.1, higher frequency data that allows to measure Fed tone in a way comparable to
our analysis of the ECB has become available only very recently and the number of observations is very small.
The Fed has introduced press conferences comparable to those of the ECB only recently (in April 2011).
The statements released after FOMC meetings are generally very short and do not allow for a comprehensive
textual analysis.
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testimony is available to market participants in real time, and that the Fed Chair’s speech
is carefully drafted in advance to convey the Fed’s intentions to the public.
Transcripts for these testimonies are available from July 1996, providing us with a series
of 37 transcripts up to fall 2014 (the end of our sample period). Over this period, the average
time interval between two testimonies is 130 days and the shortest interval is 52 days. We
measure Fed tone in the same way as for ECB PCs and find that tone become more positive
(negative) compared to the previous testimony in 20 (16) cases and that tone matters for
U.S. equity and government bond prices.
Figure 9 shows distinct patterns for equity returns and yield changes depending on
whether Fed tone becomes more positive or negative. Over the two months following the
testimony (corresponding to the shortest 52-day interval between any two consecutive tes-
timonies), cumulative equity returns are around 3% when tone has become more positive
compared to -1% when tone has become more negative. The slope coefficient from regress-
ing cumulative stock returns on tone changes is positive and becomes increasingly significant
with time passed since the last testimony. We also find that tone matters for changes in the
U.S. government bond yield curve, both, around the days of testimonies to Congress and
beyond. A more negative Fed tone is associated with a decrease in yields (across maturities
up to 20 years) up to the day after the testimony to the U.S. Senate as well as over the next
two months. By contrast, a more positive Fed tone is associate with an immediate increase in
yields and a much smaller decrease in yields over the two-months following the testimonies.
The difference in yield changes conditional on Fed tone becoming more positive or negative
is largest for short-term yields, which appears consistent with the view that central banks
control the short end of the yield curve.
One caveat is that we only have 36 observations available in this exercise. However, our
findings on how U.S. equity and government bond markets relate to changes in Fed tone
appear significant from an economic perspective. Qualitatively, the results are identical to
those for ECB press conferences: a more positive central bank tone is associated with higher
equity returns and higher bond yields compared to changes in asset prices when central bank
tone becomes more negative.
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7. Conclusion
We use a systematic and objective approach to measure the tone of central bank statements
and evaluate its impact on asset prices. To quantify tone, we apply standard techniques of
textual analysis from the recent finance literature. Our empirical analysis focuses on the
European Central Bank (ECB), which has been the first major central bank to establish
live press conferences as a communication channel after meetings of its Governing Council.
These press conferences begin with a statement by the ECB president that presents real-time
news about monetary policy decisions, contains fresh information about ECB views, and is
made available to all market participants at the same time. Our sample covers a total of 185
press conferences between January 1999 and October 2014.
Our results document a strong link between ECB tone and equity returns. On the day
of the press conference, a more positive (negative) tone, compared to the previous press
conference, is associated with increasing (decreasing) stock prices. This effect is statistically
significant, economically large, and persists over the cycle to the next press conference.
Throughout our sample, the equity premium in European markets accumulates subsequent
to positive tone changes whereas it diminishes when ECB tone becomes more negative. The
same patterns prevail in the stock markets of individual Eurozone countries.
Changes in ECB tone also affect government bond prices, with more positive tone being
related to a higher level and a more pronounced hump of the yield curve. Finding that ECB
tone matters for yields is consistent with the notion that central banks use communication
as a device to manage market expectations. However, since equity prices also increase when
tone becomes more positive, our results suggest that tone affects asset prices via their risk
premium component. More positive ECB tone appears to increase equity prices and bond
yields because it lowers the risk aversion of market participants. In line with this conjecture,
we find that tone changes are significantly related to asset prices that are very sensitive to
changes in risk aversion such as variance risk premia and corporate credit spreads.
Our conclusions on how central bank tone matters for asset prices also apply to U.S.
markets. Measuring the tone of the Fed chair’s semiannual Congressional Testimonies, we
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find that a positive change in Fed testimony tone is associated with increases in equity prices
and increases in Treasury bond yields.
Our work is related and contributes to various strands of the literature by showing that
central bank tone is a key communication feature that affects asset prices. Changes in
central bank tone appear to matter for the risk-taking of market participants and for (the
interpretation of) monetary policy shocks, which are typically measured by changes in market
prices around policy meetings and announcements.
35
References
Beber, A., Brandt, M., Luisi, M., 2015, “Distilling the Macroeconomic News Flow,” Journal
of Financial Economics, forthcoming.
Bekaert, G., Hoerova, M., Lo Duca, M., 2013, “Risk, Uncertainty, and Monetary Policy,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 60, 771–788.
Bernanke, B. S., Gertler, M., 1999, “Monetary Polic and Asset Price Volatility,” In: New
Challenges of Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole Con-
ference Proceedings.
Bernanke, B. S., Gertler, M., 2001, “Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset
Prices?,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 91, 253–257.
Bjornland, H. C., Leitermo, K., 2009, “Identifying the Interdependence between US Mone-
tary Policy and the Stock Market,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 56, 275–282.
Blinder, A. S., Ehrmann, M., Fratzscher, M., De Haan, J., Jansen, D.-J., 2008, “Central
Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence,” Journal
of Economic Literature, 46, 910–945.
Born, B., Ehrmann, M., Fratzscher, M., 2013, “Central Bank Communication on Financial
Stability,” Economic Journal, 124, 701–734.
Brand, C., Turunen, J., Buncic, D., 2010, “The Impact of ECB Monetary Policy Decisions
and Communication on the Yield Curve,” Journal of the European Economic Association,
8, 1266–1298.
Buraschi, A., Carnelli, A., Whelan, P., 2014, “Monetary Policy and Treasury Risk Premia,”
Working Paper, Imperial College Business School.
Campbell, J., Pflueger, C., Viceira, L., 2015, “Monetary Policy Drivers of Bond and Equity
Risks,” Working Paper, Harvard Univeristy.
Chodorow-Reich, G., 2014, “Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy on Financial Insti-
tutions,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring, 155–227.
Cieslak, A., Morse, A., Vissing-Jorgensen, A., 2016, “Stock Returns over the FOMC Cycle,”
Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley.
Cochrane, J. H., Piazzesi, M., 2008, “Decomposing the Yield Curve,” Working Paper,
Chicago Booth.
di Giovanni, J., McCrary, J., von Wachter, T., 2009, “Following Germany’s Lead: Using
International Monetary Linkages to Estimate the Effect of Monetary Policy on the Econ-
omy,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 91, 315–331.
36
Ehrmann, M., Fratzscher, M., 2007, “Communication by central bank committee members:
Different strategies, same effectiveness?,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 39, 509–
541.
Gertler, M., Karadi, P., 2015, “Monetary Policy Surprises, Credit Costs, and Economic
Activity,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7, 44–76.
Gilchrist, S., Leahy, J. V., 2002, “Monetary Policy and Asset Prices,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 49, 75–97.
Guerkaynak, R., Sack, B., Swanson, E., 2005, “Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words?
The Response of Asset Prices to Monetary Policy Actions and Statements,” International
Journal of Central Banking, 1, 55–93.
Gurun, U. G., Butler, A. W., 2012, “Don’t Believe the Hype: Local Media Slant, Local
Advertising, and Firm Value,” Journal of Finance, 67, 561–598.
Hanson, S., Stein, J. C., 2014, “Monetary Policy and Long-Term Real Rates,” Journal of
Financial Economics, forthcoming.
Hattori, M., Schrimpf, A., Sushko, V., 2015, “The Response of Tail Risk Perceptions to
Unconventional Monetary Policy,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, forth-
coming.
Hillert, A., Jacobs, H., Mu¨ller, S., 2014, “Media Makes Momentum,” Review of Financial
Studies, 27, 3467–3501.
Kohn, D. L., Sack, B. P., 2004, “Central Bank Talk: Does It Matter and Why?,” In:
Macroeconomics, Monetary Policy, and Financial Stability, pp. 175–206. Ottawa: Bank
of Canada.
Krishnamurthy, A., Nagel, S., Vissing-Jorgensen, A., 2015, “ECB policies involving govern-
ment bond purchases: Impact and channels,” Working paper.
Krishnamurthy, A., Vissing-Jorgensen, A., 2011, “The Effects of Quantitative Easing on
Interest Rates: Channels and Implications for Policy,” Brookings Paper on Economic
Activity, Fall 2011, 215–265.
Litterman, R., Scheinkman, J., 1991, “Common Factors Affecting Bond Returns,” The Jour-
nal of Fixed Income, 1, 54–61.
Loughran, T., McDonald, B., 2011, “When is a Liability not a Liability? Textual Analysis,
Dictionaries, and 10-Ks,” Journal of Finance, 66, 35–65.
Loughran, T., McDonald, B., 2016, “Textual Analysis in Finance and Accounting: A Sur-
vey,” Journal of Accounting Research, 54, 1187–1230.
37
Lucca, D. O., Moench, E., 2015, “The Pre-FOMC Announcement Drift,” Journal of Finance,
70, 329–371.
Lucca, D. O., Trebbi, F., 2009, “Measuring Central Bank Communication: An Automated
Approach with Application to FOMC Statements,” NBER Working Paper 15367.
Miranda-Agrippino, S., Rey, H., 2014, “World Asset Markets and Global Liquidity,” Working
Paper, London Business School.
Morris, S., Shin, H., 2014, “Risk-Taking Channel of Monetary Policy: A Global Game
Approach,” Working Paper, Princeton University.
Newey, W. K., West, K. D., 1987, “A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix,” Econometrica, 55, 703–708.
Rigobon, R., Sack, B., 2004, “The Impact of Monetary Policy on Asset Prices,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 51, 1553–1575.
Romer, C. D., Romer, D. H., 2004, “A New Measure of Monetary Shocks: Derivation and
Implications,” American Economic Review, 94, 1055–1084.
Rosa, C., 2011, “Words that Shake Traders: The Stock Market’s Reaction to Central Bank
Communication in Real Time,” Journal of Empirical Finance, 18, 915–934.
Rosa, C., Verga, G., 2007, “On the Consistency and Effectiveness of Central Bank Commu-
nication: Evidence from the ECB,” European Journal of Political Economy, 23, 146–175.
Savor, P., Wilson, M., 2013, “How Much Do Investors Care About Macroeconomic Risk? Ev-
idence from Scheduled Earnings Announcements,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis, 46, 343–375.
Savor, P., Wilson, M., 2014, “Asset Pricing: A Tale of Two Days,” Journal of Financial
Economics, 113.
Shiller, R., Campbell, J., Schoenholtz, K., 1983, “Forward Rates and Future Policy: Inter-
preting the Term Structure of Interest Rates,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
pp. 173–223.
White, H., 1980, “A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct
Test for Heteroscedasticity,” Econometrica, 48, 817–838.
Woodford, M., 2005, “Central Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness,” NBERWork-
ing Paper No. 11898.
38
Table I: The Tone of ECB Press Conference Statements
This table reports descriptive statistics for the 185 ECB press conferences between January
7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. The column ‘Cycle’ presents statistics on the length of the press
conference (PC) cycle, i.e., the number of business days between PCs. N/T reports the ratio
of the number of negative words divided by the total number of words in the president’s
opening statement at the PC (in percentage points). ∆τ measures the change in tone τ
compared to the tone at the previous PC, where τ = 1 − N/T as defined in Equation (1);
reported numbers are the changes in percentage points. For the 184 realizations of ∆τ , we
also report the coefficient of an AR(1) regression and the associated t-statistic. ‘Obs ∆τ > 0’
denotes the number of tone changes when tone becomes more positive and ‘Obs ∆τ < 0’
counts the observations when tone becomes more negative.
Cycle [in days] N/T [in %] ∆τ
Mean 22.255 2.703 -0.002
Std dev 5.700 0.988 0.795
Min 10.000 0.361 -2.409
Q5 15.000 1.323 -1.419
Q25 20.000 1.990 -0.435
Median 20.000 2.616 0.047
Q75 25.000 3.230 0.445
Q95 30.000 4.799 1.271
Max 50.000 5.651 2.015
AR(1) -0.424
t-statistic [-6.36]
Obs ∆τ > 0 100.000
Obs ∆τ < 0 84.000
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Table II: Which words drive tone?
This table presents descriptives statistics for the “negative” words (as classified by the dic-
tionary of Loughran and McDonald, 2011) that are most prevalent in ECB press conference
statements. The left panel, reports the 20 most frequently used negative words, ordered by
the number of their occurrence across all ECB press conferences statements. The center and
right panels show the context in which negative words are most frequently used by the ECB
by presenting counts for bigrams and trigrams (i.e., sequences of two and three adjacent
words), respectively. The analysis is based on 185 ECB press conference statements between
January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014.
Words # Bigrams # Trigrams #
weak 361 global imbalances 86 correction global imbalances 38
decline 321 weaker expected 46 disorderly correction global 36
imbalances 216 correction global 38 global imbalances regard 36
concerns 205 fiscal imbalances 38 imbalances regard price 36
volatility 168 imbalances regard 37 possibility disorderly correction 26
negative 163 disorderly correction 36 pressures possibility disorderly 25
deficit 148 possibility disorderly 35 financial market volatility 23
unemployment 132 excessive deficit 30 high level unemployment 22
crucial 125 level unemployment 28 prolonged period low 22
dampened 112 prolonged period 26 financial market turmoil 21
challenges 107 disorderly developments 25 disorderly developments owing 20
downward 105 remain weak 25 owing global imbalances 20
slow 88 excessive deficits 24 balance sheet restructuring 18
adverse 81 market volatility 24 concerns remain relating 18
correction 80 financial turmoil 22 crucial social partners 18
disorderly 67 high unemployment 21 weaker expected domestic 17
restructuring 67 market turmoil 21 insufficient implementation structural 16
excessive 61 revised downwards 21 unemployment euro area 16
turmoil 61 short-term volatility 21 excessive deficit procedure 15
protracted 45 address challenge 20 negative feedback loop 15
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Table III: Equity Returns on ECB Press Conference Days
This table reports results for the returns of Eurozone equity indexes on days on which the ECB holds a press
conference (PC). We use data for the EuroStoxx 50 (ESX50), the MSCI EMU (MSCI), the MSCI Value EMU
(Value), and the MSCI Growth EMU (Growth). We compute returns from the closing prices on the day
preceding the PC and the day on which the PC is held. For each index, our sample includes a total of 184
returns between the 185 ECB press conferences from January 7, 1999 to October 2, 2014. Panel A reports
average returns across PC days and non-PC days, respectively. Values in brackets are t-statistics and p[F]
reports the p-value of an F -test for equal means. Panel B reports average returns separately for the 100 (84)
observations at which the tone of the ECB becomes more positive (negative) compared to the previous PC,
along with t-statistics and p-values of F -tests for equal means. Panels C and D present results of regressing
PC-day equity returns on the signs of ECB tone changes and on ECB tone changes, respectively. Values
reported for a and b represent estimates of the intercept and slope coefficients. All t-statistics are based on
White (1980) standard errors.
Panel A. PC versus Non-PC Days
No PC PC p[F]
ESX50 1.03 -3.26 0.70
[0.43] [-0.27]
MSCI 1.16 -4.02 0.62
[0.53] [-0.36]
Value 1.66 -6.24 0.47
[0.71] [-0.54]
Growth 0.81 -1.63 0.81
[0.38] [-0.14]
Panel B. Positive versus Negative Tone Changes
∆τ > 0 ∆τ < 0 p[F]
ESX50 26.43 -38.59 0.01
[1.47] [-2.49]
MSCI 23.00 -36.18 0.01
[1.39] [-2.56]
Value 19.23 -36.57 0.02
[1.08] [-2.72]
Growth 26.52 -35.13 0.01
[1.70] [-2.22]
Panel C. Regressions on Signs of Tone Changes
a b R2
ESX50 -0.61 32.51 3.79
[-0.51] [2.75]
MSCI -0.66 29.59 3.72
[-0.61] [2.72]
Value -0.87 27.90 3.09
[-0.78] [2.50]
Growth -0.43 30.82 3.97
[-0.39] [2.78]
Panel D. Regressions on Tone Changes
a b R2
ESX50 -0.00 0.38 3.26
[-0.26] [2.50]
MSCI -0.00 0.35 3.30
[-0.36] [2.53]
Value -0.00 0.30 2.22
[-0.54] [2.12]
Growth -0.00 0.40 4.21
[-0.14] [2.76]
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Table IV: Equity Returns over Press Conference Cycles
This table present results on how changes in ECB tone revealed at the most recent ECB press conference
(PCt) affect equity returns. Using data for the EuroStoxx 50 (ESX50), the MSCI EMU (MSCI), the MSCI
Value EMU (Value), and the MSCI Growth EMU (Growth), we compute returns from the closing prices on
the day preceding PCt and the day preceding PCt+1. Results excluding PC-day return effects are based on
returns computed from the closing prices of the day of PCt to the day preceding PCt+1. For each index, our
sample covers a total of 184 PC-cycle returns (including or excluding PC-days) between the 185 ECB press
conferences held from January 7, 1999 to October 2, 2014. Panels A and B present results of regressing PC-
cycle equity returns on ECB tone changes including the PC-day return and excluding the PC-day return,
respectively. Values reported for a and b represent estimates of the intercept and slope coefficients with
associated t-statistics i n brackets. All t-statistics are based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors.
In Panels C and D, we present results for decomposing the full sample period (‘all’), at a daily frequency,
into periods where the latest PC revealed an improvement or a deterioration in ECB tone as indicated by
‘∆τ > 0’ and ‘∆τ < 0’, respectively. For each equity index, we compute cumulative returns as the arithmetic
sum of daily returns (“simple”) as well as cumulative geometric returns to account for compounding effects
(“comp.”). Results in Panel C (D) include (exclude) PC-day returns.
Panel A. PC Cycle Regressions
a b R2
ESX50 0.00 1.26 3.06
[0.28] [2.77]
MSCI 0.00 1.32 3.52
[0.40] [2.95]
Value 0.00 1.40 3.26
[0.56] [2.73]
Growth 0.00 1.25 3.45
[0.27] [3.09]
Panel B. Regressions excluding PC days
a b R2
ESX50 0.00 0.89 1.78
[0.31] [2.03]
MSCI 0.00 0.97 2.25
[0.46] [2.28]
Value 0.00 1.10 2.34
[0.68] [2.24]
Growth 0.00 0.85 1.90
[0.26] [2.21]
Panel C. Dissecting Aggregate Equity Returns
ESX50 MSCI Value Growth
obs simple comp. simple comp. simple comp. simple comp.
all 4076.00 33.98 -10.94 37.81 -0.22 52.99 10.44 28.37 -7.66
∆τ > 0 2264.00 69.96 55.44 71.15 64.46 89.72 92.41 55.70 43.00
∆τ < 0 1812.00 -35.98 -42.71 -33.34 -39.33 -36.73 -42.60 -27.33 -35.42
Panel D. Dissecting Aggregate Equity Returns over Non-PC Days
ESX50 MSCI Value Growth
obs simple comp. simple comp. simple comp. simple comp.
all 3892.00 39.97 -2.99 45.20 9.79 64.48 26.78 31.36 -2.74
∆τ > 0 2164.00 43.53 21.32 48.15 32.51 70.49 61.33 29.18 11.08
∆τ < 0 1728.00 -3.56 -20.04 -2.95 -17.14 -6.01 -21.41 2.18 -12.44
42
Table V: Individual Country Equity Returns
This table reports results for PC-day and PC-cycle returns of individual Euro-member country equity indexes.
The PC-day results in Panels A, B, and C are presented in the same way as the Eurozone results in Table
III (Panels A, B, and D), the PC-cycle results in Panel D are presented as described in Table IV for Panel A.
Panel A. PC versus Non-PC Days
No PC PC p[F]
Austria 1.00 3.53 0.83
[0.41] [0.31]
Belgium 0.12 5.28 0.62
[0.06] [0.51]
Finland 1.40 20.77 0.24
[0.40] [1.04]
France 1.68 -5.95 0.48
[0.73] [-0.50]
Germany 2.02 -8.11 0.37
[0.84] [-0.66]
Ireland -1.56 4.74 0.62
[-0.59] [0.35]
Italy 0.29 -10.88 0.31
[0.13] [-0.88]
Netherlands 1.26 -1.82 0.77
[0.57] [-0.18]
Portugal -1.44 -4.90 0.70
[-0.77] [-0.53]
Spain 1.59 -0.16 0.88
[0.65] [-0.01]
Panel B. Positive versus Negative Tone Changes
∆τ > 0 ∆τ < 0 p[F]
Austria 19.78 -15.83 0.12
[1.25] [-1.00]
Belgium 33.77 -28.63 0.00
[2.44] [-1.91]
Finland 58.47 -24.12 0.04
[2.49] [-0.73]
France 24.73 -42.47 0.00
[1.43] [-2.88]
Germany 17.37 -38.45 0.02
[0.92] [-2.71]
Ireland 35.49 -31.88 0.01
[1.69] [-2.12]
Italy 15.37 -42.13 0.02
[0.86] [-2.65]
Netherlands 20.96 -28.93 0.02
[1.38] [-2.21]
Portugal 10.01 -22.65 0.08
[0.77] [-1.79]
Spain 25.32 -30.48 0.03
[1.41] [-1.82]
Panel C. PC Day Regressions
a b R2
Austria 0.00 0.26 1.79
[0.32] [1.75]
Belgium 0.00 0.28 2.49
[0.52] [2.09]
Finland 0.00 0.70 4.19
[1.07] [2.69]
France -0.00 0.36 3.26
[-0.51] [2.45]
Germany -0.00 0.32 2.39
[-0.66] [2.08]
Ireland 0.00 0.24 1.08
[0.35] [1.21]
Italy -0.00 0.35 2.71
[-0.89] [2.56]
Netherlands -0.00 0.28 2.48
[-0.17] [2.19]
Portugal -0.00 0.26 2.74
[-0.53] [2.50]
Spain -0.00 0.34 2.50
[-0.01] [2.14]
Panel D. PC Cycle Regressions
a b R2
Austria 0.00 0.92 1.11
[0.51] [1.26]
Belgium 0.00 1.21 2.43
[0.20] [1.68]
Finland 0.00 1.81 2.04
[0.68] [2.02]
France 0.00 1.29 3.56
[0.60] [2.48]
Germany 0.00 1.53 3.47
[0.69] [2.37]
Ireland -0.00 1.02 1.48
[-0.70] [1.65]
Italy -0.00 0.93 1.51
[-0.17] [1.69]
Netherlands 0.00 1.40 4.06
[0.52] [2.53]
Portugal -0.00 0.80 1.17
[-0.72] [1.39]
Spain 0.00 1.11 2.02
[0.64] [1.99]
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Table VI: Tone changes and Monetary Policy Shocks
This table reports results for regressions of EuroStoxx50 returns on tone changes (∆τt,t−1), lagged
tone changes (∆τt−1,t−2), and monetary policy shocks shocks, measured as the 1y government bond
yield change on PC days (∆i1yt ). The left part of the table refers to regressions with PC day returns
as the dependent variable, computed from the closing prices on the day preceding the PC and the
day on which the PC is held. The right part of the table refers to regressions with PC cycle
returns, computed from the closing prices on the day preceding PCt and the day preceding PCt+1.
t-statistics for PC day regressions are based on White (1980) standard errors and t-statistics for
PC cycle regressions are based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors. Our sample covers a
total of 185 ECB press conferences held from January 7, 1999 to October 2, 2014.
PC days PC cycles
(i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
∆τt 0.38 0.41 0.35 1.26 1.26 1.09
[2.50] [2.74] [2.47] [2.77] [2.67] [2.47]
∆τt−1 0.10 0.03 -0.16 -0.36
[0.43] [0.08] [-0.29] [-0.74]
∆i1yt 0.02 0.05
[2.35] [2.19]
R2[%] 3.26 2.54 6.83 3.06 2.36 5.44
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Table VII: Yield Changes on ECB Press Conference Days
This table reports results for changes in yield curve factors on days that the ECB holds a press conference.
We measure level, slope, and curvature as the first three principal components of the yield curve. Then,
we compute changes in level, slope, and curvature from the closing prices on the day preceding the PC and
the PC day. In total, we have 184 changes for each factor between the 185 ECB press conferences held
from January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. Panel A presents average changes on PC days and non-PC
days. Values in brackets are t-statistics and p[F] reports the p-value of an F -test for equal means. Panel
B reports average changes separately for the 100 (84) observations at which the tone of the ECB becomes
more positive (negative) compared to the previous press conference, along with t-statistics and p-values of
F -tests for equal means. Panels C and D present results of regressing PC-day yield factor changes on the
signs of ECB tone changes and on ECB tone changes, respectively. Values reported for a and b represent
estimates of the intercept and slope coefficients. All t-statistics are based on White (1980) standard errors.
Panel A. PC versus Non-PC Days
No PC PC p[F]
Level -0.114 0.661 0.02
[-1.56] [2.37]
Slope -0.172 2.462 0.01
[-0.84] [2.63]
Curvature -0.008 -0.010 0.99
[-0.13] [-0.05]
Panel B. Positive versus Negative Tone
∆τ > 0 ∆τ < 0 p[F]
Level 1.404 -0.224 0.00
[3.47] [-0.64]
Slope 3.695 0.995 0.15
[2.67] [0.83]
Curvature -0.070 0.062 0.73
[-0.26] [0.23]
Panel C. Regressions on Signs of Tone Changes
a b R2
Level 0.059 0.814 4.59
[2.20] [3.04]
Slope -0.234 1.350 1.12
[2.56] [1.48]
Curvature -0.000 -0.066 0.06
[-0.02] [-0.34]
Panel D. Regressions on Tone Changes
a b R2
Level 0.000 0.005 1.03
[2.38] [1.36]
Slope 0.000 -0.016 0.94
[2.64] [-1.19]
Curvature -0.000 -0.002 0.31
[-0.05] [-0.75]
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Table VIII: Yield Changes over ECB Press Conference Cycles
This table reports results for yield factor changes over the cycle of ECB press conferences (PCs), with level,
slope, and curvature estimated as the first three principal components of the yield curve. We compute
changes in level, slope, and curvature from the closing prices on the day before a PC takes place to the day
preceding the next PC. In total, we have 184 PC-cycle changes for each factor between the 185 ECB press
conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. Panel A reports average changes separately for
the 100 (84) PCs at which the tone of the ECB becomes more positive (negative) compared to the previous
PC along with t-statistics and p-values of F -tests for equal means. Panel B present results of regressing
PC-cycle yield factor changes on ECB tone changes. Values reported for a and b represent estimates of the
intercept and slope coefficients. All t-statistics are based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors.
Panel A. Positive versus Negative Tone
∆τ > 0 ∆τ < 0 p[F]
Level 0.41 -4.15 0.15
[0.16] [-2.01]
Slope 0.44 -2.83 0.68
[0.09] [-0.42]
Curvature -1.95 1.95 0.01
[-1.96] [1.79]
Panel B. Regressions on Tone Changes
a b R2
Level -0.00 0.04 2.17
[-0.90] [2.12]
Slope -0.00 -0.04 0.39
[-0.25] [-0.69]
Curvature -0.00 -0.03 6.04
[-0.26] [-2.49]
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Table IX: Regressions of real-time macro growth on tone changes
This table reports results for regressions of changes in real-time macro indices on changes in tone (∆τ) over
PC cycles (Panel A) and for predictive regressions of changes in real-time macro indices on tone changes for
fixed forecast horizons ranging from 5, 10, ..., 250 trading days. The left part of Panel A reports results for
contemporaneous regressions (changes from one press conference to the next) and the right part presents
results for regressions of changes in real-time macro indices on lagged changes in tone (i.e., tone changes
from the previous press conference cycle). We only report slope coefficients and R2s in both panels. The
real-time macro indices employed in these regressions correspond to “economic activity” (Econ), ”sentiment”
(Sent), and ”growth” and are taken from Beber et al. (2015). We report t-statistics based on standard errors
following Newey and West (1987) in brackets. We standardize the independent variable (tone changes) in all
regressions for ease of interpretability. R2s are reported in parentheses. The sample covers 184 tone changes
between the 185 ECB press conferences held from January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014.
Panel A. Tone changes and real-time macro over PC cycles
Contemporaneous Predictive
Econ Sent Growth Econ Sent Growth
∆τ 0.04 0.08 0.04 ∆τ 0.00 0.01 0.03
[0.43] [1.05] [0.47] [0.07] [0.13] [0.11]
R2(%) (0.20) (0.72) (0.20) R2(%) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Panel B. Tone changes and real-time macro for fixed forecast horizons
horizon Econ Sent Growth horizon Econ Sent Growth
5 days -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 60 days 0.03 0.00 0.04
[-0.49] [-1.70] [-0.41] [0.58] [-0.01] [0.69]
(0.10) (1.41) (0.07) (0.09) (0.00) (0.13)
10 days -0.05 0.04 -0.04 120 days 0.10 -0.04 0.10
[-0.84] [0.92] [-0.74] [1.72] [-0.77] [1.83]
(0.21) (0.27) (0.17) (0.96) (0.16) (1.01)
30 days 0.02 0.02 0.02 250 days 0.07 -0.06 0.07
[0.43] [0.40] [0.47] [1.59] [-1.02] [1.49]
(0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.49) (0.40) (0.49)
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Table X: Uncertainty and Risk Aversion
This table shows results for regressions of changes in uncertainty and risk aversion on lagged tone
changes over ECB press conference cycles. We follow Bekaert et al. (2013) and measure uncertainty
as the conditional variance (R̂V ARt) obtained from a regression of realized variance on lagged
realized variance and lagged V STOXX2; the VSTOXX is a volatility index computed from prices
of options on the Eurostoxx50, similar to the VIX in the U.S.). The regression-implied variance risk
premium, i.e. V̂ RPt = V STOXX
2
t − R̂V ARt, serves as the proxy for risk aversion. The sample
covers 184 tone changes between the 185 ECB press conferences held from January 7, 1999 and
October 2, 2014.
Panel A. PC cycles
a b R2
Uncertainty -0.00 -2.36 0.45
[-0.01] [-0.80]
Risk aversion 0.00 -2.93 5.40
[0.10] [-2.34]
Panel B. PC cycles, excluding PC days
a b R2
Uncertainty -0.00 -3.23 0.94
[-0.01] [-1.10]
Risk aversion -0.00 -3.18 5.19
[-0.13] [-2.02]
48
Figure 1: The Tone of ECB Press Conference Statements
(a) Tone level (τ)
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(b) Changes in ECB Tone (∆τ)
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This figure plots the time-series of ECB tone, τ , and changes in ECB tone, ∆τ , in Panels (a) and (b),
respectively. Tone is defined as τ = 1 − N/T , see Equation (1), where N and T denote the number of
negative words and the total number of words in a press conference statement. ∆τ is measured as the
difference in τ of two subsequently held press conferences. Tone is measured form the ECB president’s
opening statements at the 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. The
solid vertical lines mark these 185 press conferences.
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Figure 2: Equity Returns on Press Conference Days
(a) All PC days (b) PCs with positive tone change (c) PCs with negative tone change
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This figure plots the returns of Eurozone equity indexes on days on which the ECB holds a press conference (PC). We use data for the EuroStoxx
50 (ESX50), the MSCI EMU (MSCI), the MSCI Value EMU (Value), and the MSCI Growth EMU (Growth). We compute returns from the
closing prices on the day preceding the PC and the day on which the PC is held. For each index, we have a total of 184 returns between the
185 ECB press conferences held from January 7, 1999 to October 2, 2014. Panel (a) refers to average PC-day returns across all PCs. Panels (b)
and (c) plot average returns separately for the 100 (84) observations at which the tone of the ECB becomes more positive (negative) compared
to the previous PC.
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Figure 3: Equity Returns following ECB Press Conferences
(a) Equity returns following press conferences
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Figure 3 (continued)
(b) Coefficients of regressing equity returns on tone changes
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This figure shows how changes in ECB tone affect equity returns. In Panel (a), we plot the average k-day
cumulative equity returns from k = 0 (representing the PC-day return) up to k = 15. The green (red) lines
plot the average cumulative returns on the k-th day after the PC, conditional on the tone being revealed at
the press conference having been more positive (negative) compared to the previous one; values are reported
in basis points. The dashed blue line represents the average return accumulating up to day k after the
PC. Panel (b) plots the coefficients (and 90% confidence bands based on White (1980) standard errors) for
regressing k-day cumulative returns on changes in tone revealed at the preceding press conference. The
sample spans a total of 184 tone changes from 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and
October 2, 2014.
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Figure 4: Individual Country Equity Returns on Press Conference Days
(a) All PC days
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(c) PCs with negative tone change
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This figure plots the press conference (PC)-day returns of individual Eurozone country MSCI equity indexes.
We compute returns from the closing prices on the day preceding the PC and the day on which the PC is
held. We compute a total of 184 returns between the 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999
and October 2, 2014. Panel (a) refers to average PC-day returns across from all PCs. Panels (b) and (c)
plot average returns separately for the 100 (84) observations at which the tone of the ECB becomes more
positive (negative) compared to the previous PC. The countries covered are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE),
Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), and
Spain (ES).
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Figure 5: Yield Changes on ECB Press Conference Days
(a) PC versus non-PC days
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(b) Positive versus negative tone changes
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(c) Regressions on signs of tone changes
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(d) Regressions on tone changes
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This figure presents results on changes in the yield curve (for maturities ranging from one to 20 years, x-
axis) on days that the ECB holds a press conference. Panel (a) plots average daily yield changes on PC days
(blue boxes) compared to non-PC days (black circles). Panel (b) presents average PC-day yield changes
conditional on ECB tone becoming more positive (green) or negative (red). Panel (c) plots intercept- and
slope coefficients from regressing yield changes (of individual maturities) on the sign of the tone change
revealed at the press conference, i.e., on the sign of ∆τ , in orange and blue respectively; the dotted lines
represent 90% confidence bands (based on White (1980) standard errors). Panel (d) plots slope coefficients
of regressing yield changes on changes in ECB tone along with 90% confidence bands. The sample spans a
total of 184 tone changes from 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014.
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Figure 6: Yield Changes over Press Conference Cycles
(a) Positive vesus negative tone changes
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(b) Regressions on tone changes
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This figure presents results on changes in the yield curve (for maturities ranging from one to 20 years, x-axis)
over cycles of ECB press conferences (PCs). Panel (a) presents average PC-to-PC yield changes conditional
on the tone changes at the most recent PC having been positive (green) or negative (red). Panel (b) plots
the slope coefficients from regressing yield changes (of individual maturities) on changes in ECB tone (∆τ),
along with 90% confidence bands (based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors). The sample spans a
total of 184 tone changes from 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014.
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Figure 7: Corporate credit spread changes
(a) Positive vesus negative tone changes
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(b) Regressions on tone changes
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This figure presents results for regressions of changes in corporate credit spreads (BBB-AAA rated corporate
bonds) on tone changes. Panel (a) presents the average cumulative change in the credit spread conditional on
tone changes at the most recent PC having been positive (green) or negative (red). Panel (b) plots the slope
coefficients from regressing credit spread changes on changes in ECB tone (∆τ), along with 90% confidence
bands (based on White (1980) standard errors). The sample spans a total of 184 tone changes from 185
ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014.
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Figure 8: ECB Tone and Changes in Equity Market Volatility
(a) Regressions on tone changes: PC days
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(b) Regressions on tone changes: PC cycles
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This figure presents results on the link between ECB tone and market expectations of future equity volatility
as measured by the VSTOXX volatility index, which is constructed from options on the EuroStoxx50. In
our analysis of how ECB tone changes and tone shocks affect market volatility on ECB press conference
(PC) days and over PC cycles, we use the VSTOXX sub-indices for maturities of one, two, three, six, nine,
twelve, 18, and 24 months. Panel (a) plots slope coefficients of regressing PC-day changes in volatility on
tone changes along with 90% confidence bands (based on White (1980) standard errors for PC days and
Newey and West (1987) standard errors for PC cycles) and Panel (b) presents analogue results for changes in
implied equity volatility over PC-cycles. Our sample of covers 185 ECB press conferences between January
7, 1999 and October 2, 2014.
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Figure 9: U.S. Markets following Congressional Testimonies of the Fed Chair
(a) U.S. stock market returns
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(b) Changes in U.S. government bond yields
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This figure shows how changes in Fed tone revealed at the Chair’s most recent Congressional Testimony
affect U.S. stock market returns and U.S. government bond yield changes. In Panel (a), present results for
equity returns. On the left, we plot the average k-day cumulative equity returns from k = 0 (representing the
date of the testimony) up to k = 52. The green (red) lines plot the average cumulative returns on the k-th
day after the testimony, conditional on the tone being revealed at the testimony having been more positive
(negative) compared to the previous one; values are reported in basis points. The dashed blue line represents
the average return accumulating up to day k after the testimony. On the right, we plot the coefficients (and
90% confidence bands based on White (1980) standard errors) for regressing k-day cumulative returns on
changes in tone revealed at the preceding testimony. Panel (b) presents results on cumulative changes in U.S.
government bond yields (for maturities ranging from one to 20 years, x-axis) over 2 days and 52 days from
the testimony on the left and right, respectively. We present yield changes conditional on Fed tone becoming
more positive (green) or negative (red), and the dashed blue line represents average cumulative yield changes
up to day k after the testimony. The sample spans a total of 36 tone changes from 37 testimonies from 1996
to 2014.
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IA.A. Data sources and tickers
This Appendix details the sources of data used in the empirical analysis.
Equity data. We use data on stock returns for the EuroStoxx 50, the MSCI EMU All cap index, as
well as the MSCI Value EMU and MSCI Growth EMU index. MSCI data for all three indices are obtained
from Datastream and the mnemonics are MS1EMUL (MSCI All cap EMU), MSVEMUL (MSCI Value
EMU), and MSGEMUL (MSCI Growth EMU). Historical data for the EuroStoxx 50 and corresponding
implied volatilities (VSTOXX) at different maturities can be downloaded from here (EuroStoxx50 data)
and here (VSTOXX implied volatilities), respectively.
Term structure of yields. We employ yield curve data for the term structure of German
government bonds from 1 to 20 years provided by Deutsche Bundesbank. These series can be downloaded
from here. The tickers of the series we use are: BBK01.WT3211, BBK01.WT3213, BBK01.WT3215,
BBK01.WT3217, BBK01.WT3219, BBK01.WT3221, BBK01.WT3223, BBK01.WT3225, BBK01.WT3227,
BBK01.WT3229, BBK01.WT3431, BBK01.WT3433, BBK01.WT3435, BBK01.WT3437, BBK01.WT3439,
BBK01.WT3441, BBK01.WT3443, BBK01.WT3445, BBK01.WT3447, BBK01.WT3449.
Real-time macro indices. We employ real-time measures of economic activity (“Econ”), growth
(“Growth”), as well as a real-time measure of economic sentiment (“Sent”) for the Eurozone . These
real-time measures are based on Beber et al. (2015) and we thank the authors for sharing these indices
with us.
IA – 2
Table IA.1: ECB Tone and Policy Rates
This table reports results for the link between ECB policy rates and ECB press conference tone, using the interest rates on
the main refinancing operations (Panel A), the deposit facility (Panel B), and the marginal lending facility (Panel C). We
measure changes in policy rates from the PC at time t to the PC at time t + 1 and regress these changes on the tone change
revealed at the time-t press conference, i.e., on ∆τt,t−1, in our baseline specification (i). Other specifications (ii-iv) additionally
include lagged tone changes (∆τt−1,t−2) and/or lagged changes in policy rates over the previous two PC cycles (∆rt,t−1 and
∆rt−1,t−2). The last row reports the adjusted-R2 in percentage points. In total, we have 184 PC-cycle changes between the
185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. The left part of the Table reports results when using
all 184 PC cycle changes, the right part reports results when only using the PC cycles with nonzero changes in policy rates (39
cycles for Panels A and B, 37 cycles for Panel C). All t-statistics are based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors.
Panel A. Rate on the main refinancing operations
All PC cycles PC cycles with nonzero rate changes
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
const -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03
[-1.29] [-0.75] [-0.78] [-0.77] [-1.39] [-0.58] [-0.63] [-0.70]
∆τt,t−1 4.84 5.48 4.95 18.79 16.66 13.35
[2.51] [2.80] [2.39] [3.49] [3.33] [1.98]
∆τt−1,t−2 -1.28 -7.43
[-0.89] [-1.03]
∆rt,t−1 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.46 0.54 0.66
[2.44] [2.72] [2.94] [3.16] [3.21] [4.15]
∆rt−1,t−1 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.78 0.64 0.55
[2.88] [3.02] [2.96] [6.55] [4.81] [3.38]
R2[%] 4.91 14.44 20.88 20.72 19.53 35.79 51.75 51.91
Panel B. Rate on the deposit facility
All PC cycles PC cycles with nonzero rate changes
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
const -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.00
[-1.02] [-0.53] [-0.54] [-0.54] [-0.87] [-0.27] [0.01] [-0.03]
∆τt,t−1 4.85 5.77 5.57 21.10 19.01 18.29
[2.78] [3.17] [2.93] [4.19] [4.85] [2.97]
∆τt−1,t−2 -0.47 -1.32
[-0.28] [-0.16]
∆rt,t−1 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.83 0.86 0.88
[1.68] [1.91] [1.96] [6.65] [8.58] [8.21]
∆rt−1,t−1 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.73 0.64 0.63
[2.81] [2.93] [2.89] [5.28] [7.30] [6.09]
R2[%] 4.53 14.83 21.43 21.02 19.56 47.06 64.51 63.41
Panel C. Rate on the marginal lending facility
All PC cycles PC cycles with nonzero rate changes
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
const -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06
[-1.56] [-1.20] [-1.22] [-1.22] [-1.47] [-1.31] [-1.11] [-1.17]
∆τt,t−1 5.42 5.92 5.17 23.26 21.44 16.98
[2.58] [2.83] [2.26] [4.36] [4.48] [2.10]
∆τt−1,t−2 -1.85 -9.61
[-1.13] [-1.03]
∆rt,t−1 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.49 0.65 0.79
[2.06] [2.26] [2.43] [5.00] [4.92] [4.46]
∆rt−1,t−1 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.82 0.57 0.45
[2.13] [2.17] [2.03] [6.73] [3.46] [2.10]
R2[%] 4.90 5.94 11.84 11.83 21.38 25.96 43.79 44.02
IA – 3
Table IA.2: ECB Tone and Survey Expectations of Macroeconomic Fundamentals
This table reports results for regressing changes in survey expectations about macro fundamentals from the
press conference (PC) at time t to t + 1 on the change in ECB tone revealed at the PC at time t, i.e.,
∆τt,t−1. The survey data is provided by Consensus Economics, who conduct the surveys towards the end
of the month. Because the exact date is not reported in the data (which only contains the publication
data in the first half of the subsequent month), we set the the date to five business days before the end of
the month; results are very similar when using the end of the month or ten days earlier. The surveys cover
expectations about expected percentage changes in real GDP growth (gdp), real consumption growth (cons),
real industrial production growth (ip), percentage changes in consumer and producer prices (cpi and ppi),
percentage changes in wages (wage), unemployment (unem, as percentage of labour force), and expectations
of three month and ten year interest rates one three months ahead (i3mt+3m and i
10y
t+3m) and one year ahead
(i3mt+1y and i
10y
t+1y). In total, we have 184 PC-cycle changes between the 185 ECB press conferences between
January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. All t-statistics are based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors.
The last row in each panel reports the regression R2 in percentage points.
Panel A. Germany
gdp cons ip cpi ppi wage unem i3mt+3m i
10y
t+3m
i3mt+1y i
10y
t+1y
∆τt,t−1 2.780 0.864 8.891 1.276 1.337 -0.016 -1.817 0.385 -0.558 0.564 -0.934
[1.11] [0.63] [1.25] [0.98] [0.55] [-0.02] [-1.61] [0.16] [-0.32] [0.25] [-0.74]
R2[%] 0.870 0.266 1.222 0.791 0.178 0.000 1.470 0.030 0.057 0.057 0.238
Panel B. France
gdp cons ip cpi ppi wage unem i3mt+3m i
10y
t+3m
i3mt+1y i
10y
t+1y
∆τt,t−1 2.884 2.142 11.107 1.909 -0.354 -0.445 0.505 0.979 1.999 1.168
[1.44] [1.72] [1.95] [1.77] [-0.39] [-0.33] [0.21] [0.57] [0.94] [0.84]
R2[%] 1.602 2.002 3.037 2.397 0.083 0.055 0.050 0.164 0.668 0.284
Panel C. Italy
gdp cons ip cpi ppi wage unem i3mt+3m i
10y
t+3m
i3mt+1y i
10y
t+1y
∆τt,t−1 2.412 1.834 6.557 -0.446 5.147 -1.260 -0.534 0.638 -2.879 1.616 -1.867
[1.03] [1.04] [1.09] [-0.38] [1.44] [-1.47] [-0.41] [0.27] [-1.31] [0.73] [-0.99]
R2[%] 0.865 0.844 0.773 0.094 1.322 1.404 0.092 0.079 0.925 0.428 0.549
Panel D. Netherlands
gdp cons ip cpi ppi wage unem i3mt+3m i
10y
t+3m
i3mt+1y i
10y
t+1y
∆τt,t−1 2.618 -0.634 6.386 1.251 -0.677 0.304 -1.238 -0.891 -0.943
[1.01] [-0.28] [1.43] [0.97] [-0.64] [0.14] [-0.72] [-0.44] [-0.59]
R2[%] 0.813 0.035 1.122 0.594 0.189 0.019 0.255 0.127 0.148
Panel E. Spain
gdp cons ip cpi ppi wage unem i3mt+3m i
10y
t+3m
i3mt+1y i
10y
t+1y
∆τt,t−1 3.751 4.537 0.843 1.213 -0.798 0.706 -0.930 -0.061 -2.010
[1.66] [2.19] [0.13] [0.80] [-0.43] [0.25] [-0.51] [-0.03] [-1.22]
R2[%] 2.245 2.364 0.009 0.422 0.130 0.088 0.107 0.001 0.592
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Table IA.3: What drives tones changes?
This table reports results for regressions of tone changes on potential drivers, such as changes in the level,
slope, and curvature of the yield curve, VSTOXX changes, lagged stock returns (EuroStoxx 50), and changes
in real-time macro indices (“economic activity”“ and sentiment”, denoted RT Econ and RT Sent, respec-
tively). The latter are based on Beber et al. (2015)). The timing in this regression is such that we regress
changes in tone (∆τ) from the previous to the current press conference on changes in the independent
variables from the previous press conference until the day before the current press conference. We report
t-statistics based on standard errors following Newey and West (1987) in brackets. The sample covers 184
tone changes between the 185 ECB press conferences held from January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
∆Level 0.48 0.21
[1.53] [0.51]
∆Slope -18.77 -11.42
[-1.74] [-1.01]
∆Curvature 252.96 271.95
[3.59] [3.68]
∆VSTOXX -2.06 -1.63
[-0.99] [-0.80]
Lagged returns -1.14 -0.40
[-0.70] [-0.22]
RT Econ 0.12 0.17
[0.46] [0.61]
RT Sent 0.09 0.13
[1.14] [1.64]
R2(%) 7.33 -0.33 -0.44 8.32
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Figure IA.1: Press conference days and timing of returns
Oct 2, 2013 Nov 7, 2013 Dec 5, 2013
PC day PC day PC day
PC cycle
PC cycle (ex PC Day)
This figure illustrates the timing of our different return measures using three subsequent ECB press confer-
ences. Returns on press conference (PC) days are measured as the return from the close of the day preceding
the PC to the close of the day on which the PC takes place. Returns over the “PC cycle” are measured as the
return from the close of the day preceding a PC to the close of the day preceding the next PC. Returns over
PC cycles that exclude the PC day itself (“PC cycle (ex PC)”) are computed from the close of the day on
which a PC takes place to the close of the trading day preceding the next PC. Since ECB press conferences
are held on Thursday afternoon before European equity market close, the “PC cycle (ex PC day)” window
does not contain any PC event.
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Figure IA.2: Equity Returns following Press Conferences: Controlling for Policy Rate Changes
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This figure shows how changes in ECB tone revealed at the most recent ECB press conference (PC) affect
equity returns when controlling for changes in policy rates. Our initial sample spans a total of 184 tone
changes from 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. From this sample, we
remove press conferences at which changes in ECB policy rates have been announced. We plot the coefficients
(and 90% confidence bands, based on White (1980) standard errors) for regressing k-day cumulative returns
on changes in tone revealed at the preceding press conference. We evaluate the returns of four Eurozone
equity indexes: EuroStoxx 50 (ESX50), the MSCI EMU (MSCI), the MSCI Value EMU (Value), and the
MSCI Growth EMU (Growth).
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Figure IA.3: ECB Tone and Yield Changes: Controlling for Policy Rate Changes
(a) Positive versus negative tone changes: PC days
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(b) Regressions on tone changes: PC days
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(c) Positive versus negative tone changes: PC cycles
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(d) Regressions on tone changes: PC cycles
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This figure presents results on how changes in ECB tone affect the yield curve when controlling for policy
actions. Our initial sample spans a total of 184 tone changes from 185 ECB press conferences (PCs) between
January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. From this sample, we remove press conferences at which changes
in ECB policy rates have been announced. We evaluated the affect on yields with maturities ranging from
one to 20 years (x-axis) on PC-days and over PC-cycles. Panel (a) presents average PC-day yield changes
conditional on ECB tone becoming more positive (green) or negative (red). Panel (b) plots slope coefficients
of regressing PC-day yield changes on changes in ECB tone along with 90% confidence bands based on White
(1980) standard errors. Panels (c) and (d) present analogue results for yield changes over PC-cycles with
90% confidence bands based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors.
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Figure IA.4: Equity Returns following Press Conferences: Controlling for Policy Actions
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This figure shows how changes in ECB tone revealed at the most recent ECB press conference (PC) affect
equity returns when controlling for policy actions. Our initial sample spans a total of 184 tone changes from
185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. From this sample, we remove
press conferences at which changes in ECB policy rates and/or unconventional policy measures have been
announced. We plot the coefficients (and 90% confidence bands, based on Newey and West (1987) standard
errors) for regressing k-day cumulative returns on changes in tone revealed at the preceding press conference.
We evaluate the returns of four Eurozone equity indexes: EuroStoxx 50 (ESX50), the MSCI EMU (MSCI),
the MSCI Value EMU (Value), and the MSCI Growth EMU (Growth).
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Figure IA.5: ECB Tone and Yield Changes: Controlling for Policy Actions
(a) Positive versus negative tone changes: PC days
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(b) Regressions on tone changes: PC days
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(c) Positive versus negative tone changes: PC cycles
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(d) Regressions on tone changes: PC cycles
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This figure presents results on how changes in ECB tone affect the yield curve when controlling for policy
actions. Our initial sample spans a total of 184 tone changes from 185 ECB press conferences (PCs) between
January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014. From this sample, we remove press conferences at which changes in
ECB policy rates and/or unconventional policy measures have been announced. We evaluated the affect
on yields with maturities ranging from one to 20 years (x-axis) on PC-days and over PC-cycles. Panel (a)
presents average PC-day yield changes conditional on ECB tone becoming more positive (green) or negative
(red). Panel (b) plots slope coefficients of regressing PC-day yield changes on changes in ECB tone along with
90% confidence bands based on White (1980) standard errors. Panels (c) and (d) present analogue results for
yield changes over PC-cycles with 90% confidence bands based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors.
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Figure IA.6: Equity Returns following ECB Press Conferences: ‘Tone Shocks’
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This figure shows how changes in ECB tone revealed at the most recent ECB press conference (PC) affect
equity returns when using ‘tone shocks’ instead of raw tone changes. From our sample of 184 tone changes
from 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014, we compute the time series of
tone changes, and measure tone shocks as the residuals from an AR(1)-regression. Using these tone shocks,
we plot the coefficients (and 90% confidence bands, based on White (1980) standard errors) for regressing
k-day cumulative returns on tone shocks revealed at the preceding press conference. We evaluate the returns
of four Eurozone equity indexes: EuroStoxx 50 (ESX50), the MSCI EMU (MSCI), the MSCI Value EMU
(Value), and the MSCI Growth EMU (Growth).
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Figure IA.7: ECB Tone and Yield Changes: ‘Tone Shocks’
(a) Positive versus negative tone changes: PC days
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(b) Regressions on tone changes: PC days
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(c) Positive versus negative tone changes: PC cycles
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(d) Regressions on tone changes: PC cycles
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This figure presents results on how ECB tone ‘shocks’ affect the yield curve. . From our sample of 184
tone changes from 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014, we compute
the time series of tone changes, and measure tone shocks as the residuals from an AR(1)-regression. Using
these tone shocks, we evaluated the affect on yields with maturities ranging from one to 20 years (x-axis)
on PC-days and over PC-cycles. Panel (a) presents average PC-day yield changes conditional on ECB tone
shocks being positive (green) or negative (red). Panel (b) plots slope coefficients of regressing PC-day yield
changes on tone shocks along with 90% confidence bands based on White (1980) standard errors. Panels
(c) and (d) present analogue results for yield changes over PC-cycles with 90% confidence bands based on
Newey and West (1987) standard errors.
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Figure IA.8: Equity Excess Returns following ECB Press Conferences
(a) Equity excess returns following press conferences
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(continued on next page)
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Figure IA.8 (continued)
(b) Coefficients of regressing equity excess returns on tone changes
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This figure shows how changes in ECB tone revealed at the most recent ECB press conference (PC) affect
equity excess returns. In Panel (a), we plot the average k-day cumulative equity excess returns from k = 0
(representing the PC-day return) up to k = 15. The green (red) lines plot the average cumulative excess
returns on the k-th day after the PC, conditional on the tone being revealed at the press conference having
been more positive (negative) compared to the previous one; values are reported in basis points. The
dashed blue line represents the average excess return accumulating up to day k after the PC. Panel (b)
plots the coefficients (and 90% confidence bands based on White (1980) standard errors) for regressing k-day
cumulative returns on changes in tone revealed at the preceding press conference. The sample spans a total
of 184 tone changes from 185 ECB press conferences between January 7, 1999 and October 2, 2014.
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